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ABSTRACT 
  Chevron deference has become increasingly controversial. Some 
Justices on the Supreme Court have stated that they would overrule 
Chevron, and others have urged that it be curtailed. If Chevron were 
merely modified rather than overturned, it is unclear what that 
modified Chevron would look like. This Article argues that the time 
has come to narrow Chevron’s domain by limiting Chevron deference 
to interpretations announced in rulemaking and not those announced 
in adjudication. 
  Under the classic formulation of Chevron, a court should defer to 
an agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutory language. 
This formulation is grounded in the notion that Congress, at least 
implicitly, signals a preference for agency rather than judicial 
decisionmaking when it delegates broad policymaking discretion as 
part of charging an agency with implementing and administering a 
statute. In United States v. Mead Corp., the Supreme Court began 
defining what has come to be known as Chevron’s domain—holding 
that Congress did not intend courts to defer to every agency resolution 
of statutory ambiguity, but rather only to those articulated in agency 
actions that carry legal force and thus reflect the exercise of delegated 
power. As a consequence of the Mead Court’s analysis, courts typically 
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defer under the Chevron standard to interpretations offered in notice-
and-comment rulemakings and in formal adjudications, and apply the 
less deferential Skidmore standard in reviewing those advanced 
through less formal formats like interpretative rules and policy 
statements. Meanwhile, interpretations announced via informal 
adjudications represent a gray area for Mead’s analysis.  
  With the benefit of hindsight, we believe that Mead did not go far 
enough in curtailing Chevron’s reach. Applying Chevron to 
interpretations announced through adjudication has proven 
problematic in practice and has fueled a great deal of the anti-Chevron 
criticism. Meanwhile, Chevron’s claim to stare decisis in the context of 
adjudications is surprisingly weak. Using a novel dataset of cases, this 
Article shows that the Supreme Court has applied Chevron only rarely 
in evaluating agency adjudications. We submit that this relative dearth 
of precedent is best explained by the fact that Chevron makes the most 
conceptual sense when applied to agency rulemakings. Accordingly, if 
the Court is looking for a way to address deference short of eliminating 
it, the soundest way to revisit Chevron is by narrowing its domain to 
exclude most if not all agency adjudications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Administrative law today finds itself in a state of commotion.1 
With the additions of Justices Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and 
Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court, many expect the Court to 
rethink longstanding doctrines governing the administrative state. 
Indeed, the Court has already begun to do so. Since 2019, the Court 
has narrowed Auer2 deference3 and looked beyond the four corners of 
an agency decision for perhaps the first time in history.4 Five Justices 
now have called for a reinvigoration of the nondelegation doctrine.5 
Based on what the Justices have already said, this trend seems likely to 
continue.6  
As part of this rethinking, the Court seems to be taking a more 
jaundiced view of Chevron7 deference.8 Simultaneously, a new wave of 
 
 1. See, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the 
Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164, 166 (2019); Gillian E. 
Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under 
Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 49–50 (2017); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative 
Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 853, 854–55 (2020).  
 2. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 3. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2423 (2019) (narrowing Auer, 519 U.S. 452). 
 4. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2578 (2019) (rejecting the agency’s 
asserted rationale as pretextual). 
 5. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2142 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting, 
joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J.) (calling for the aggressive use of nondelegation); id. at 
2031 (Alito, J., concurring) (“If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach 
we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”); Paul v. United States, 140 S. 
Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (endorsing Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent); see also 
Nicholas Bagley, Opinion, ‘Most of Government Is Unconstitutional,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019), 
https://nyti.ms/2Y7UsXg [https://perma.cc/2HE8-EDB8] (expressing alarm about the Justices’ 
enthusiasm for nondelegation). 
 6. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(expressing skepticism about aspects of modern administrative law); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing 
Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2136–38 (2016) (same); Brian Lipshutz, Justice 
Thomas and the Originalist Turn in Administrative Law, 125 YALE L.J. F. 94, 100–02 (2015) 
(same); David Feder, The Administrative Law Originalism of Neil Gorsuch, YALE J. REGUL.: 
NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov. 21, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-administrative-law-originalism-
of-neil-gorsuch [https://perma.cc/A8PU-KTU5] (same). 
 7. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 8. See, e.g., Dino Grandoni, The Energy 202: Republicans Want To Know if Environmental 
Groups Are Really Foreign Agents, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2018, 8:53 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-energy-202/2018/09/06/the-energy-202-
HICKMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2021  5:14 PM 
934  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:931 
anti-Chevron scholarship has emerged,9 and members of Congress are 
pursuing legislation purporting to overturn the Chevron standard.10 
Whether prompting or prompted by these voices, or perhaps both, the 
Court seems inclined to go along with the crowd. Chief Justice John 
Roberts has gone out of his way to invite further litigation over 
Chevron.11 And Justice Gorsuch, writing for a majority of the Court, 
twice has suggested that Chevron may not be long for this world.12 At 
a minimum, the Justices seem more willing to find clarity using 
traditional tools of statutory interpretation, thereby avoiding Chevron 
deference altogether.13  
Going further, Justice Kavanaugh has argued that the Chevron 
framework itself is flawed and that exceptions to it should be 
understood broadly.14 Justices Gorsuch and Clarence Thomas have 
 
republicans-want-to-know-if-environmental-groups-are-really-foreign-agents/5b9007281b326b3f31919f99 
[https://perma.cc/U7N6-GRXK] (“Brett M. Kavanaugh hinted he may want to revisit if confirmed 
a doctrine important to environmental regulations called Chevron deference.”); Gutierrez-
Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1155–56 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (similar). 
 9. See, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 
126 YALE L.J. 908, 997–1000 (2017). To be clear, Chevron’s critics vary in their objections. Some 
object to deference in general. See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1187, 1227 (2016). Others argue merely that Chevron should be replaced with a less deferential 
standard. See, e.g., Jack M. Beerman, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron 
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 843–50 (2010); 
Richard W. Murphy, Abandon Chevron and Modernize Stare Decisis for the Administrative State, 
69 ALA. L. REV. 1, 49–56 (2017).  
 10. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, SOPRA? So What? Chevron Reform Misses the Target 
Entirely, 14 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 580, 587–88 (2018) (documenting different versions of the 
Separation of Powers Restoration Act passed by the House of Representatives in 2016 and 2017 
that sought to overturn Chevron legislatively). 
 11. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and in 
the judgment) (joining the Court’s decision to uphold Auer deference but specifically noting that 
his vote does not extend to Chevron deference). 
 12. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1629 (2018) (“No party to these cases 
has asked us to reconsider Chevron deference.”); SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 
(2018) (“[W]hether Chevron should remain is a question we may leave for another day.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1629; SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1358; Jonathan Adler, 
Shunting Aside Chevron Deference, REGUL. REV. (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/
2018/08/07/adler-shunting-aside-chevron-deference [https://perma.cc/55S3-ZN2K] (“Chevron 
deference was raised in defense of agency interpretations of statutory language in five cases this 
past term, and in all five cases a majority of the Court rejected the agency’s plea.”). 
 14. See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting) (“The FCC’s net neutrality rule is a major rule, but Congress has not clearly 
authorized the FCC to issue the rule. For that reason alone, the rule is unlawful.”); Kavanaugh, 
supra note 6, at 2150 (“Chevron encourages the Executive Branch . . . to be extremely aggressive 
in seeking to squeeze its policy goals into ill-fitting statutory authorizations and restraints.”). 
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questioned the very constitutionality of Chevron deference.15 Justice 
Stephen Breyer, for his part, has never liked the Chevron standard.16 
And Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito also have sought 
openly to water down the doctrine.17 Hence, today, the Court may have 
enough votes to step back from Chevron.18 In one of his last opinions, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy maintained that the time has come to 
reexamine Chevron.19 Reflecting this zeitgeist, seasoned lawyers now 
invoke Chevron with trepidation.20 In short, although not (yet?) 
abandoned to the anticanon, the message is clear: Chevron is on thin 
ice.  
This hostility has prompted alarm among Chevron’s defenders.21 
These defenders argue that when a statute administered by an agency 
is ambiguous—and thereby arguably confers a certain amount of 
policymaking discretion to the interpreter—politically accountable 
agency officials should have interpretative primacy.22 Some defenders 
also express concern about judges assuming too great a policymaking 
 
 15. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(highlighting “the scope of the potentially unconstitutional delegations we have come to 
countenance in the name of Chevron deference”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 
1156 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing that Chevron conflicts with Article III’s 
duty to say what the law is). 
 16. See e.g., SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1364 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I understand Chevron as a 
rule of thumb, guiding courts in an effort to respect that leeway which Congress intended the 
agencies to have.”); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 363, 364–65 (1986) (similar). 
 17. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 323–27 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting, 
joined, inter alia, by Alito, J.) (advancing a narrower theory of Chevron). 
 18. See, e.g., Asher Steinberg, Does Anyone on the Supreme Court Believe in Chevron 
Anymore? A Squib on Chevron in SAS Inst., NARROWEST GROUNDS (Apr. 26, 2018), https://
narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2018/04/does-anyone-on-supreme-court-believe-in.html [https://
perma.cc/TBZ5-3BLQ] (counting votes). 
 19. See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]t 
seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, the premises that underlie 
Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Daniel Hemel, Argument Analysis: Hating on Chevron, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 
7, 2018, 1:43 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-analysis-hating-on-chevron 
[https://perma.cc/7EXR-TPNT] (discussing an argument in BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos, 139 S. Ct. 
893 (2019), where BNSF counsel stated “I hate to cite it, but I will end with Chevron . . . .”). 
 21. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 1, at 17 (noting “attacks”); cf. Nicholas Bagley & Julian 
Davis Mortenson, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) 
(manuscript at 20–21), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3512154 [https://
perma.cc/Y39M-KM4U] (expressing concern that the Supreme Court will invalidate the 
intelligible principle standard and describing the same as “radical stuff”).  
 22. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power To Say What the 
Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2590 (2006).  
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role absent Chevron, given Congress’s longstanding habit of delegating 
authority.23 Others advance historical arguments for Chevron 
deference.24 In response, however, skeptics increasingly question 
whether Chevron is lawful, as either a statutory or a constitutional 
matter,25 and whether the doctrine creates bad incentives.26 Suffice it to 
say, these are big fights that will no doubt continue to command much 
attention.  
Whatever one’s view of Chevron generally,27 it is especially 
important now for the bench and bar to recall that not every agency 
interpretation is eligible for Chevron deference. In United States v. 
Mead Corp.,28 the Court categorically limited “Chevron’s domain”—
the contexts in which such deference is available29—to agency actions 
carrying the force of law.30 The Court also recognized that Chevron 
deference is particularly fitting for interpretations adopted using 
formal procedures.31 Courts, therefore, generally use the Chevron 
standard in evaluating interpretations of ambiguous statutes offered by 
 
 23. See, e.g., Nicholas Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1392, 1455–56 (2017). 
 24. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the 
Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 951–53 (2011); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Chevron As Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1652–56 (2019). 
 25. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (questioning whether Chevron is statutorily authorized); Bamzai, supra note 9, at 
912–19 (questioning whether Chevron is historically justified). 
 26. Compare generally, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Chevron On Stilts: A Response to Jonathan 
Siegel, 72 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 77 (2018) (challenging Chevron), and Charles J. Cooper, The 
Flaws of Chevron Deference, 21 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 307 (2017) (similar), with Jonathan R. 
Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. REV. 937 (2018) (defending 
Chevron).  
 27. For what it is worth, one of us believes that Chevron (or something much like it) is 
inevitable so long as Congress delegates policymaking discretion to agencies, see, e.g., Bednar & 
Hickman, supra note 23, at 1460, while the other is more skeptical but agrees that some efforts to 
limit Chevron create difficult line-drawing problems and that doctrinal coherence is valuable, see, 
e.g., Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19, 
54–55 (2010).  
 28. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 29. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 
(2001); see also Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1441, 858–63 (2018) (expanding on the formulation of Chevron’s domain); Kent 
Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2017) 
(noting that “scholars have focused on Chevron’s domain—that is, when Chevron applies in 
judicial review”).  
 30. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27. 
 31. See id. at 229–30. 
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agencies in notice-and-comment rulemakings and in formal 
adjudications. By contrast, courts typically apply the less deferential 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.32 standard33 to interpretations advanced 
through informal mediums, like interpretative rules and policy 
statements.34 Meanwhile, agency interpretations announced through 
informal adjudication represent a gray area for Chevron’s scope.35  
The Mead Court’s decision to narrow Chevron’s domain offers the 
Justices a path forward. Despite the noise, the Supreme Court is 
unlikely to overrule Chevron outright. Last year, in Kisor v. Wilkie,36 
the Justices declined to overrule Auer deference, which applies to 
agency interpretations of their own regulations, despite its lack of 
theoretical justification.37 Stare decisis played a substantial role in the 
Court’s retention of Auer deference, which is unsurprising because the 
Court had not previously provided much of a theoretical basis for 
Auer.38 By contrast, the Court has articulated and defended Chevron’s 
theoretical underpinnings on the merits,39 and the Chief Justice, 
although arguing for a less robust Chevron, has not called for it to be 
overruled altogether.40 Yet as in Kisor, even if the Justices are unwilling 
 
 32. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 33. Id. at 140. 
 34. See, e.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 227–28.  
 35. See 1 KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 3.6 (6th ed. 2018) (detailing how Mead is applied).  
 36. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
 37. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 617–18 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Our cases have not put forward a persuasive justification for Auer deference.”); 
Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole Rock, 65 
EMORY L.J. 47, 100 (2015) (documenting Auer’s “unrestrained expansion . . . untethered from its 
origins without any meaningful explanation as to why”). 
 38. In Kisor, Justice Elena Kagan attempted to provide a theoretical basis for Auer 
deference and cited a number of cases that addressed aspects of the doctrine in support of that 
analysis. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2410–11. Her effort, however, did not command a majority. See id. at 
2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (casting the deciding vote on stare decisis grounds without 
joining the theoretical discussion); cf. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68–69 
(2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining why the theoretical justifications given for Chevron 
have wrongly been unthinkingly applied to Auer). 
 39. See, e.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (discussing the Court’s understanding of congressional 
expectations upon delegating policymaking discretion); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (justifying Chevron deference on grounds of delegation, 
expertise, and political accountability); see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 514–19 (discussing justifications for 
Chevron).  
 40. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (contending that the Court’s 
decision in Kisor does not prevent the Court from reconsidering Chevron, but not taking a 
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to overrule Chevron, they still may want to curtail it.41 If so, the Justices 
need a coherent way to cut back on Chevron without jettisoning it 
altogether.  
Building on Mead, this Article argues that the best way to curtail 
Chevron going forward is to further narrow its domain. Specifically, the 
Court should eliminate, or at least reduce, deference to agency 
adjudications. Three justifications support this position.  
First, narrowing Chevron’s domain is more consistent with the 
doctrine’s theoretical underpinnings: delegation, expertise, and 
accountability. Again, the Court has held that Chevron first and 
foremost requires a delegation from Congress to an agency of the 
power to act with the force of law.42 Whether Congress has delegated 
the authority to adopt legally binding rules and regulations is readily 
ascertainable from statutory text.43 By contrast, which interpretations 
announced in adjudications carry the force of law has proven much 
harder to discern. In fact, counterintuitively, some lower courts now 
apply Chevron and defer to agencies’ own assessments of whether 
Congress intended them to use formal adjudication procedures. This 
approach enables agencies essentially to bootstrap their own way into 
Chevron deference under the Mead standard.44 Removing most 
adjudications from Chevron’s domain returns to Congress the decision 
of which agency interpretations are Chevron-eligible. Also, rulemaking 
is open to the public, meaning that agencies can benefit from the 
greater knowledge and wider perspectives that come from public 
comments and engagement with many groups, thus strengthening 
political legitimacy.45 Adjudication, by contrast, typically involves a 
 
position regarding whether Chevron should be overturned); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 
290, 314–17 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (critiquing the Court’s application of Chevron 
doctrine but not arguing that the doctrine itself should go).  
 41. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2408 (“Auer deference retains an important role in construing agency 
regulations. But even as we uphold it, we reinforce its limits.”). 
 42. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.  
 43. See, e.g., City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 293 (identifying the FCC’s statutory authority to 
adopt legally binding regulations). 
 44. See, e.g., Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 18–19 (1st Cir. 
2006); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1480–83 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also infra 
Part II.B. (documenting this issue). 
 45. See, e.g., Maggie McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State, 127 
YALE L.J. 1538, 1603 (2018) (arguing that “the participation of individuals and minorities” in 
modern government occurs through “the notice and comment rulemaking process and the 
petitions required by the APA”). 
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narrow set of parties and, consequently, substantially less public input 
and data. If the purpose of Chevron deference is to allow more 
politically accountable agencies to bring their expertise to bear, it 
follows that agencies should be transparent and informed. 
Rulemaking, more than adjudication, advances that purpose.  
Second, narrowing Chevron’s scope would go a long way toward 
answering some of the most weighty fairness objections levelled against 
Chevron, such as those advanced by Justice Gorsuch.46 Unlike 
adjudication, which is retroactive in that it evaluates and assigns 
present legal consequences to past actions, rulemaking is prospective 
in character.47 The Court’s renewed focus on principles of foundational 
“fair warning”48 thus also counsels in favor of a narrower domain for 
Chevron.  
Third, narrowing Chevron’s reach will also result in a more 
predictable and consistent application of the doctrine by the courts. A 
narrower doctrine is a simpler one. As it is now, courts regularly 
struggle to determine whether an interpretation announced in 
adjudication should receive deference under Mead. Mead itself is 
hardly a model of clarity on this important point.49 This confusion 
makes litigation much more expensive and complicated. When all of 
these justifications are considered together, the case against Chevron 
in the adjudicative context becomes quite strong.  
Stare decisis is the obvious objection to this proposal. Yet, even if 
stare decisis preserves Chevron from outright repudiation, it should not 
prevent narrowing Chevron’s domain in the way this Article proposes. 
 
 46. On the Tenth Circuit, then-Judge Gorsuch authored two important opinions about 
Chevron. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1144 (10th Cir. 2016); De Niz Robles v. 
Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1168 (10th Cir. 2015). In 2005, a federal court concluded that the attorney 
general had discretion to adjust the status of certain immigrants. See Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 
426 F.3d 1294, 1301 (10th Cir. 2005), amended and superseded on reh’g, 453 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 
2006). In the wake of that decision, Alfonzo De Niz Robles and Hugo Rosario Gutierrez-Brizuela 
came forward to petition for relief. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1144; De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d 
at 1168. Yet later, the Board of Immigration Appeals concluded that, in fact, such relief was 
unlawful, and then applied that interpretation retroactively to those who petitioned for relief. De 
Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1167 (citing In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (B.I.A. 2007)). Gorsuch 
pointedly objected, with considerable normative force, to the unfairness of that retroactivity. See 
Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1145–48; De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1175–80.  
 47. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216 (1998). 
 48. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2418 (2019) (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012)). 
 49. See, e.g., United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001) (offering different 
considerations to weigh in particular cases).  
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First, the stare decisis weight of Chevron for adjudications may be 
much less hefty than one might expect given the doctrine’s prominence. 
Chevron itself involved rulemaking, as have a substantial majority of 
Chevron cases to reach the Justices, especially after Mead. A review of 
every Supreme Court case citing Chevron through the 2019 term 
demonstrates that the Court has actually extended Chevron deference 
only rarely outside of the rulemaking context. Most of those cases were 
decided before Mead with no or little analysis as to why Chevron was 
the right evaluative standard. Much of the Court’s rhetoric regarding 
deference outside of the rulemaking context thus is, at best, dicta. 
Second, the Court has already held that the scope of a deferential 
standard of review can be narrowed without offending stare decisis; it 
did so twenty years ago in Mead and even more recently in Kisor.50 
Finally, for the pragmatists, narrowing Chevron’s domain poses fewer 
stare decisis concerns than overruling the doctrine outright, which is 
also on the table.  
*   *   * 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines Chevron, with 
particular focus on how Chevron’s domain fits with the Administrative 
Procedure Act’s (“APA’s”) procedural framework for different types 
of agency action. Part II explains why Chevron’s domain should be 
narrowed to exclude some or all agency adjudications. Part III 
addresses the stare decisis implications of narrowing Chevron’s 
domain. As part of that analysis, the Article reviews every case decided 
by the Supreme Court through the 2019 term that cites Chevron to 
illustrate that the Court infrequently applies Chevron in the 
adjudication context. Based on that review, the Article concludes that 
principles of stare decisis allow the sort of revision proposed here.  
I.  CHEVRON’S DOMAIN IN THEORY 
The Chevron doctrine is one of the most familiar aspects of 
administrative law, but it is also complex and increasingly 
 
 50. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, What Kisor Means for the Future of Auer Deference: The 
New Five-Step Kisor Deference Doctrine, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 26, 
2019), http://yalejreg.com/nc/what-kisor-means-for-the-future-of-auer-deference-the-new-five-
step-kisor-deference-doctrine [https://perma.cc/WT2C-GAM7] (detailing how Auer has been 
narrowed). 
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controversial. Most lawyers know the simple version of Chevron. When 
a statute is ambiguous, a reviewing court should defer to the 
administering agency’s interpretation, so long as it is reasonable.51 In 
truth, however, the question of when (to say nothing of how) Chevron 
applies is much more difficult. Although Chevron itself announces the 
simple version, the Supreme Court has stressed since then that not all 
agency interpretations should receive Chevron review.52  
Understanding when Chevron does and does not apply is no easy 
task, especially because the Supreme Court has not clearly demarcated 
Chevron’s boundaries. To the contrary, the Court’s cases often send 
conflicting signals.53  Hence the emergence of what has come to be 
known as Chevron’s “step zero,” which asks whether Chevron is even 
applicable.54 Although where the lines are and how they apply can be 
fuzzy, the Court has clearly held that there are lines55 and that 
Chevron’s two steps do not always apply. The categories of 
interpretations that courts must evaluate using the Chevron standard 
are widely referred to as “Chevron’s domain.”56  
 
 51. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 52. See, e.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27 (2001) (limiting Chevron’s scope to agency actions 
carrying the force of law); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (listing formats 
that do not merit Chevron review). 
 53. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1157 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he Court has declined to apply Chevron deference to arguably ambiguous civil 
statutes but it has only sometimes cited the Mead balancing test as the reason . . . .”); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of 
Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1097–1120 (2008) 
(documenting confusion generated by the Court’s application of seven different doctrines of 
deference and anti-deference over thirty years); Mila Sohoni, King’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1419, 1423–24 (2018) (explaining that the Court’s analysis from King v. Burwell, 135 S. 
Ct. 2480 (2015), about the scope of the major questions doctrine consists of only a “single, dense 
paragraph” with “a grab bag of reasons” (quoting Note, Major Question Objections, 129 HARV. 
L. REV. 2191, 2206 (2016))).  
 54. See, e.g., Martin v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 903 F.3d 1154, 1159 (11th Cir. 2018) 
(“Since Chevron, the Supreme Court has clarified what some refer to as ‘step zero’ of Chevron: 
the threshold requirement that an agency interpretation be of the sort that warrants Chevron 
analysis in the first instance.”); see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 29, at 836 (coining the 
term); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, 
Step Zero] (adopting the term).  
 55. See, e.g., Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (holding that Chevron did not apply and that 
“interpretations contained in formats such as opinion letters are ‘entitled to respect’ under our 
decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), but only to the extent that those 
interpretations have the ‘power to persuade’”).  
 56. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 531 (2009); Barnett & Walker, supra note 29, 
at 1442 (“Since its inception in 1984, Chevron’s domain has grown more complicated.”). 
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A. The APA’s Categories  
The Supreme Court has held that not all types of agency action 
are entitled to judicial review under the same standard of deference.57 
To understand Chevron’s domain, therefore, it is necessary to start 
with the APA,58 particularly the different types of agency action set out 
in the APA.  
The APA generally divides binding agency action in two separate 
ways. (Nonbinding agency action is a separate category altogether.) 
First, and perhaps most familiar, the APA divides what agencies do 
between rulemaking and adjudication.59 This particular line may be the 
APA’s most important innovation.60 But it is not the only distinction 
the APA draws. For both rulemaking and adjudication, the APA 
creates formal and informal varieties.61 Each type of binding agency 
action carries its own statutory procedures. Thus, when evaluating a 
particular agency action, courts and litigants must know both whether 
the action is the product of rulemaking or adjudication, and whether 
the procedures the agency used to create the action were formal or 
informal. Accordingly, at least on paper, the APA’s categories of 
agency action are as follows: 
 
 57. See, e.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 234–35. 
 58. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2018). 
 59. See id. § 551(6)–(7) (defining “adjudication” as the “agency process for the formulation 
of an order,” and “order” as “the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, 
negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but 
including licensing”); id. § 551(4)–(5) (defining “rule making” as the “agency process for 
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule,” and “rule” as “the whole or a part of an agency 
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, 
or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of 
an agency”). 
 60. See, e.g., George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act 
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1651 (1996). 
 61. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (setting forth notice-and-comment rulemaking but stating that 
“[w]hen rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency 
hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title [i.e., the sections that create the APA’s formal 
procedures] apply instead of this subsection”); id. § 554(c) (setting forth requirements for 
adjudication, including giving “all interested parties” a “hearing and decision on notice and in 
accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this title”). The APA is not as explicit about informal 
adjudication, which applies to those adjudications that are not “required by statute to be 
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.” Id. § 554(a).  
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TABLE 1: THE APA’S FOUR CATEGORIES OF AGENCY ACTION 
 
Formal Informal 
Rulemaking Rulemaking following a 
formal, oral evidentiary 
hearing 
Rulemaking using notice 
and comment 
procedures 
Adjudication Formal requirements, 
including an oral 
evidentiary hearing 
Almost no procedural 
requirements 
Reality, however, is more complicated than the APA’s text alone 
would suggest. For instance, the line between rulemaking and 
adjudication can be a slippery one, especially because the APA’s 
definition of “rule” includes “an agency statement of [both] general or 
particular applicability.”62 Thus, although many believe that the 
difference between rulemaking and adjudication is that the former 
applies broadly and the latter narrowly, that is not the line at all. 
Instead, the key distinction is that—unless Congress specifies 
otherwise—rulemaking is of “future” effect, while adjudication is 
directed toward establishing the legal consequences of events that have 
already happened.63  
To be sure, that test is not entirely satisfying. In a common law 
system, adjudication also has future effect in that “the principles 
announced in an adjudication cannot be departed from in future 
adjudications without reason.”64 Federal court adjudication, the 
principal purpose of which is to decide “cases and controversies,” 
 
 62. See id. § 551(4); see also, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 GEO. L.J. 
942, 979–80 (2017) [hereinafter Nielson, Seminole Rock] (offering and discussing an example that 
was both an adjudication and rulemaking in discussing Qwest Services Corp. v. FCC, 509 F.3d 531 
(D.C. Cir. 2007)).  
 63. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216 (1998) (Scalia, J., 
concurring): 
The only plausible reading of [‘and future effect’ in the APA] is that rules have legal 
consequences only for the future. It could not possibly mean that merely some of their 
legal consequences must be for the future, though they may also have legal 
consequences for the past, since that description would not enable rules to be 
distinguished from ‘orders,’ see 5 U.S.C. § 551(6), and would thus destroy the entire 
dichotomy upon which the most significant portions of the APA are based. 
Id.; Neustar, Inc. v. FCC, 857 F.3d 886, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“This prospective-retroactive 
distinction consistently focuses on the application of principles in the past or future.”). 
 64. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 216–17. 
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creates precedent that is then applied in subsequent cases, backed by 
stare decisis.65 Agency adjudication is similar. The future effect of 
agency adjudication is not precisely the same as that of judicial 
precedent, as agencies are not strictly bound by the same stare decisis 
principles that govern judicial adherence to precedent.66 But agency 
decisions do have some precedential effect. When an agency makes a 
decision through adjudication with respect to one set of parties, the 
public recognizes that the agency likely will follow that decision in the 
future with respect to other, like parties. In other words, “the nature of 
adjudication is that similarly situated nonparties may be affected by the 
policy or precedent applied, or even merely announced in dicta, to 
those before the tribunal.”67 In light of this precedential effect, agencies 
can—and do—consciously use adjudication as a policymaking tool for 
both the parties involved in the adjudication and the public at large. 
Still, the extra procedural steps required for rulemaking make 
changing a rule harder for an agency than overruling a precedent. 
Accordingly, policies announced in rules have greater “stickiness” than 
those announced in adjudications, meaning that the public can have 
more confidence that a policy announced via rulemaking rather than 
adjudication will have staying power.68  
The distinction between formal and informal procedures is also 
important. Distinguishing between formal and informal rulemaking is 
straightforward. To the extent that formal rulemaking exists at all in 
modern administrative law,69 the APA imposes trial-like procedures 
 
 65. See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Constitutional Structure, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 789, 
803–04 (2018). 
 66. See, e.g., Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, 
Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1813, 1824 (2012) (explaining the test for when 
agencies can change course and, as an example, discussing FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009)); Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and 
Force of Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1042 (1995) (noting that, as compared to the strict stare 
decisis effect of judicial precedent, “an agency is free to depart from an interpretation or policy it 
adopts through adjudication provided that its explanation for its departure can survive judicial 
review for arbitrariness”).  
 67. Goodman v. FCC, 182 F.3d 987, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon 
Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765–66 (1969)). 
 68. See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 91 (2018) 
[hereinafter Nielson, Sticky Regulations]. 
 69. The story of formal rulemaking’s (effective) demise has been recounted elsewhere and 
need not be repeated here. See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 
OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 239–40 (2014) [hereinafter Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking] (citing 
United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973)); see also Jack M. Beermann & Gary 
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complete with the presentation of evidence and cross-examination of 
witnesses.70 The vast majority of contemporary rulemaking, however, 
is informal.71 For informal rulemaking, the APA specifies procedures, 
known as notice and comment, that include a public notice of proposed 
rules and an opportunity for interested persons to submit written 
comments.72 Congress by organic statute sometimes includes 
additional procedures or provides exemptions from APA rulemaking 
requirements.73 In general, however, most binding rulemaking across 
the administrative state follows APA notice-and-comment procedures. 
The APA also subjects formal and informal adjudication to 
different procedures. For formal adjudication, the APA requires 
procedures akin to a trial—indeed, the same procedural requirements 
as for formal rulemaking.74 By comparison, the APA imposes virtually 
no procedural requirements for informal adjudication, at least de 
jure.75 De facto, however, there are some minimal requirements, 
especially for decisions likely to result in litigation.76 For adjudications, 
moreover, the APA’s formal and informal boxes vastly oversimplify 
reality. The APA, after all, is just a default; Congress is free to add 
more procedures to it or eliminate procedures otherwise required by 
it. And, in fact, Congress often does add more procedures.77 Organic 
 
Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 857 n.9 (2007) (“[S]ince 
Florida East Coast Railway, no organic rulemaking statute that does not contain the specific words 
‘on the record’ has ever been held to require formal rulemaking.”); Kent H. Barnett, How the 
Supreme Court Derailed Formal Rulemaking, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 1, 1 (2017) 
(questioning whether the Court was right to do so). 
 70. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–57 (2018). 
 71. HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 35, § 5.2 (“After Florida East Coast Railway, it is 
exceedingly difficult to convince a court to compel an agency to use formal rulemaking.”). One 
agency that uses formal rulemaking is the Copyright Royalty Board, but it is an outlier in this 
regard. See Andrew D. Stephenson, Note, Webcaster II: A Case Study of Business to Business 
Rate Setting by Formal Rulemaking, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 393, 405 (2011) (characterizing the 
procedures utilized by the Copyright Royalty Board as APA formal rulemaking). 
 72. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(d).  
 73. See Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, supra note 69, at 256 (discussing hybrid 
rulemaking). 
 74. See id. 
 75. HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 35, § 6.2.1 (noting the limited requirements by APA 
§ 555 for informal adjudications). 
 76. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S, 402, 416, 419 (1971) 
(interpreting APA § 706(2)(A) as requiring agencies engaging in informal adjudication to 
generate a decisionmaking record adequate to support judicial review). 
 77. See, e.g., Azar v. Allina Health Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1810–14 (2019) (analyzing the 
significance of differences between the APA and the Medicare statute’s procedural provisions); 
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statutes sometimes require procedures for agency adjudication that 
exceed those the APA imposes for informal adjudication yet fall short 
of those it imposes for formal adjudication. Conversely, agencies using 
informal adjudication often are free to incorporate formal procedures 
if they wish.78 As a result, adjudication that the APA would categorize 
as informal sometimes partakes of formal procedures too.  
In a 2016 report prepared for the Administrative Conference of 
the United States, Professor Michael Asimow recognized three rather 
than two types of agency adjudication.  
“Type A adjudication” refers to adjudicatory systems governed by 
the adjudication sections of the [APA]. With a few exceptions, Type 
A hearings are presided over by administrative law judges (ALJs). 
The term “Type B adjudication” refers to adjudication by federal 
administrative agencies through evidentiary hearings required by 
statute, regulation, or other source of law, that are not governed by 
the adjudication provisions of the APA. The hearings in Type B 
adjudication are presided over by administrative judges (AJs), 
although these officials are known by many other titles (or by the 
agency heads without the assistance of AJs) . . . . The term “Type C 
adjudication” means adjudication by federal administrative agencies 
that does not occur through legally required evidentiary hearings.79  
Asimow acknowledged that the borders between each of these 
adjudication types can be blurry in practice. He contended, however, 
that labeling Type B adjudication as informal, while perhaps 
technically correct as a matter of APA interpretation, “creates a false 
picture of Type B adjudication.”80 According to Asimow, “In some 
cases, Type B adjudication is even more formal than the familiar trial-
type adjudication procedure prescribed by the APA. In contrast, some 
Type A adjudication . . . is less formal than many Type B schemes.”81  
 
Kiewit Power Constructors Co. v. Sec’y of Lab., 959 F.3d 381, 400–01 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (observing 
that the Occupational Safety and Health Act “expressly exempted the Secretary from APA 
rulemaking” and considering the implications for Chevron deference). 
 78. See, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
524 (1978) (“Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their 
discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them if the agencies have not 
chosen to grant them.”). 
 79. Michael Asimow, Adjudication Outside the Administrative Procedure Act, ADMIN. 
CONF. U.S., 2–3 (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/adjudication-
outside-the-administrative-procedure-act-updated-draft-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QE3-42AA]. 
 80. Id. at 2. 
 81. Id. at 3. 
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Incorporating Asimow’s analysis and the effective end of formal 
rulemaking, the following chart more accurately reflects the categories 
of binding agency decisions: 
TABLE 2: A REALISTIC VIEW OF THE CATEGORIES OF AGENCY ACTION 
 
Formal Informal 
Rulemaking Rulemaking following a 
formal, oral evidentiary 
hearing 
Rulemaking using 
notice and comment 
procedures 
















B. Policymaking Under the APA 
Agencies can create policy through either rulemaking or 
adjudication. This surprising reality was blessed by the Supreme Court 
in 1947 in a foundational case known as Chenery II.82 Following the 
agency’s decision on remand from Chenery I83 (which held that nothing 
in the common law, the only source the agency had cited, prohibited 
the corporate transactions at issue84), the Court allowed the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to delineate what was and was not 
lawful for corporate reorganizations case by case through adjudication, 
rather than through rulemaking. The Court, over Justice Robert 
Jackson’s dissent,85 explained that although rulemaking has important 
 
 82. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
 83. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
 84. See id. at 95 (“[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which 
the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.”); see 
also Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 960–73 
(2007) (explaining the importance of Chenery I). 
 85. See, e.g., Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 210 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[This doctrine] reduces 
the judicial process in such cases to a mere feint.”). 
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advantages and should be preferred,86 an agency may announce policy 
in a common law fashion through adjudication. Thus, there is “a very 
definite place for the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards. 
And the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by 
individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed 
discretion of the administrative agency.”87 The upshot is that 
“adjudication [thus can] operate[] as an appropriate mechanism not 
only for factfinding, but also for the exercise of delegated lawmaking 
powers, including lawmaking by interpretation.”88 And because 
adjudication is retroactive—indeed, that is a key dividing line between 
rulemaking and adjudication—it follows that agencies can make policy 
through adjudication and that policies so developed are then applied 
against individual parties based on past conduct.89 The Court has often 
reiterated this principle.90  
To be sure, there are limits on an agency’s ability to make policy 
retroactively through adjudication91—limits reflecting that 
retroactivity is disfavored precisely because it can be unfair to those 
before the agency and a potential threat to legal stability more 
generally. Thus, agencies have less ability to retroactively impose new 
 
 86. See id. at 202 (majority opinion) (“The function of filling in the interstices of the Act 
should be performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to 
be applied in the future.”). 
 87. See id. at 203.  
 88. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 154 (1991). As the 
Court noted in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974): 
[T]he Board is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative 
proceeding and that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first 
instance within the Board’s discretion. Although there may be situations where the 
Board’s reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion or a violation 
of the Act, nothing in the present case would justify such a conclusion. 
Id. at 294. 
 89. See, e.g., Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FERC, 826 F.2d 1074, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (en banc) (“The general principle is that when as an incident of its adjudicatory function an 
agency interprets a statute, it may apply that new interpretation in the proceeding before it.”); see 
also Neustar, Inc. v. FCC, 857 F.3d 886, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[A]n adjudication must have 
retroactive effect, or else it would be considered a rulemaking.” (quoting Catholic Health 
Initiatives Iowa Corp. v. Sebelius, 718 F.3d 914, 921–22 (D.C. Cir. 2013))). 
 90. See generally, e.g., Russell L. Weaver & Linda D. Jellum, Chenery II and the 
Development of Federal Administrative Law, 58 ADMIN L. REV. 815 (2006) (explaining the 
doctrine). 
 91. See Nielson, Seminole Rock, supra note 62, at 963 (“[N]ot all retroactivity is 
permissible . . . . This is especially true when the agency’s view departs in an extreme way from 
what an ordinary person would expect—for instance, because the policy reflects an unexpected 
change from what was understood to be the law—or when fines are at issue.”).  
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policies in adjudication when doing so will result in fines or other 
penal-type sanctions.92 Likewise, agencies are less able to create new 
policy through adjudication where “the new rule represents an abrupt 
departure from well-established practice,” although, even then, the 
analysis involves a multifactor balancing test that also considers, 
among other things, the agency’s “statutory interest in applying a new 
rule despite the reliance of a party on the old standard.”93  
In recent years, the Supreme Court has expressed discomfort—
notably, even outside of the context of fines—with allowing agencies 
to make policy through interpretation when doing so does not provide 
regulated parties with “fair warning.”94 As Justice Alito explained for 
the Court in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,95 permitting an 
agency’s “interpretation of ambiguous regulations to impose 
potentially massive liability on respondent for conduct that occurred 
well before that interpretation was announced” could “seriously 
undermine the principle that agencies should provide regulated parties 
‘fair warning of the conduct [a regulation] prohibits or requires.’”96 
Justice Gorsuch has sounded similar themes. Apart from his concerns 
with retroactivity while on the Tenth Circuit,97 he addressed Chenery 
II directly at oral argument in Azar v. Allina Health Services.98 And in 
Kisor, the Court reaffirmed Auer deference, but in doing so imposed 
significant limits on that doctrine with particular concern about “unfair 
surprise.”99 
 
 92. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1330–31 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 93. Clark-Cowlitz, 826 F.2d at 1081 (quoting Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. 
NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
 94. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155–56 (2012) (quoting Gates 
& Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Rev. Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(opinion of Scalia, J.)). 
 95. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012). 
 96. Id. at 156. 
 97. See supra note 46 (citing cases and describing then-Judge Gorsuch’s arguments). 
 98. Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804 (2019); see Transcript of Oral Argument at 
62, Azar, 139 S. Ct. 1804 (No. 17-1484) (“In Chenery II, this Court did allow the government to 
engage in retroactive adjudications that affect substantive rights, but expected that it would be a 
rare thing that . . . would happen and that most of these kinds of actions would happen through 
rulemaking.”). Notwithstanding Justice Gorsuch’s statement at oral argument regarding Chenery 
II, his opinion for the Court in Allina Health Services did not make the same point. 
 99. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2417–18 (2019) (“And a court may not defer to a 
new interpretation, whether or not introduced in litigation, that creates ‘unfair surprise’ to 
regulated parties.” (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170 (2007))). 
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Even so, Chenery II is still regarded as fundamental to the 
“structure of administrative law.”100 Indeed, it is “axiomatic”; agencies 
can and do create policy through adjudication, which not only applies 
retroactively to the parties in the actual proceeding but also, via the 
decision’s “ratio decidendi,” thereafter shapes the actions of others 
who were not party to the decision but still are effectively bound by 
it.101  
C. The Simple Version of Chevron 
Chevron and agency policymaking go hand in glove; the point of 
Chevron, after all, is that where a statute is ambiguous, an agency has 
some discretion to create the policy it thinks is best.102 In recent years, 
Chevron deference has become an increasingly controversial aspect of 
administrative law. 
The history of deference has been told before.103 Suffice it to say 
here, well before Chevron was decided, courts would give at least some 
weight to at least some executive branch interpretations of the law. As 
Professor Aditya Bamzai explains, in the nineteenth century, courts 
“often ‘respected’ agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory 
provisions when those interpretations were long-standing or 
contemporaneous with the statute’s enactment.”104 Similarly, Congress 
has long granted discretion to executive branch officials, for instance 
through the use of words like “reasonable” which arguably can be 
conceptualized as a delegation of interpretative authority.  
In the twentieth century, the analysis became more muddled. 
Some cases seem like proto-Chevron cases. For example, in AT&T Co. 
v. United States,105 decided in 1936, the Supreme Court considered a 
statute that simply instructed the Federal Communications 
 
 100. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Symposium: Tampering with the Structure of Administrative 
Law, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 29, 2019, 10:23 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/01/symposium-
tampering-with-the-structure-of-administrative-law [https://perma.cc/VN2J-PXHA] (stressing 
the importance of Chenery II). 
 101. Phila. Gas Works v. FERC, 989 F.2d 1246, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 102. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has recognized that Step Two of Chevron is similar to any other 
grant of discretion to an agency. See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step 
One-and-a-Half, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 760 (2017). 
 103. See, e.g., Bamzai, supra note 9, at 930–97; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to 
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 972–80 (1992).  
 104. See Barnett & Walker, supra note 29, at 10 (citing Bamzai, supra note 9, at 943).  
 105. AT&T Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936).  
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Commission “‘in its discretion’” to “‘prescribe the forms of any and all 
accounts, records, and memoranda’ to be kept by” regulated parties 
within its jurisdiction.106 In considering a challenge to accounting 
regulations under this provision, the Court described its function on 
judicial review in highly deferential terms, explaining that it “is not at 
liberty to substitute its own discretion for that of administrative officers 
who have kept within the bounds of their administrative powers.”107 
Similarly, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., decided in 1944,108 
the Supreme Court gave weight to a National Labor Relation Board 
(“NLRB”) interpretation—announced, notably, in an adjudication, as 
almost all of the NLRB’s interpretations are109—of the word 
“employee” for the reason that Congress empowered the agency “to 
administer the Act.”110 The Court stressed that, although 
“[u]ndoudbtedly questions of statutory interpretation, especially when 
arising in the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to 
resolve,” judges should “giv[e] appropriate weight to the judgment of 
those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute.”111 
“[W]here the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory 
term,” the Justices emphasized, “the reviewing court’s function is 
limited.”112 
Yet other cases applied different standards. In Skidmore, for 
instance, the Court used “an indefinite, multifactored inquiry” when 
assessing whether and how much to defer to the agency.113 The Court 
again explained that an agency’s interpretation is not binding, but such 
an interpretation could help guide a court, with the weight to be 
afforded the agency’s view to depend “upon the thoroughness evident 
 
 106. Id. at 235 (quoting Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 220(a) (1934)). 
 107. Id. at 236. 
 108. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944), overruled in part by Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
 109. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Our Illiberal Administrative Law, 10 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 475, 508 (2016) (collecting citations). 
 110. See Hearst, 322 U.S. at 130 (“It is not necessary in this case to make a completely 
definitive limitation around the term ‘employee.’ That task has been assigned primarily to the 
agency created by Congress to administer the Act.”). 
 111. Id. at 130–31. 
 112. Id.; see also id. at 131 (“[T]he Board’s determination that specified persons are 
‘employees’ under this Act is to be accepted if it has ‘warrant in the record’ and a reasonable basis 
in law.” (emphasis added)). 
 113. Barnett & Walker, supra note 29, at 10 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944)). 
HICKMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2021  5:14 PM 
952  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:931 
in [the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those 
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”114 
And, indeed, sometimes courts purporting to apply this standard 
“appeared to apply de novo judicial review, without deference to the 
agencies.”115 In Batterton v. Francis,116 decided just seven years prior to 
Chevron, the Court maintained that reviewing courts should defer to 
“legislative, or substantive, regulations” adopted pursuant to express 
delegations from Congress to prescribe standards, even if the court 
“would have interpreted the statute in a different manner,” but 
“interpretative regulation[s]” would be given “[v]arying degrees of 
deference” in accordance with Skidmore.117  
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Chevron—a case about 
rulemaking under the Clean Air Act and the meaning of the term 
“stationary source”—and appeared to announce a new and more rule-
like test.118 Indeed, law students everywhere learn the two steps of 
Chevron.119 As the Supreme Court put it in the first (and, more or 
less,120 canonical) articulation of the test:  
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute 
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, 
is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
 
 114. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.  
 115. Barnett & Walker, supra note 29, at 11; see also Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation 
in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 552–67 (1985) (documenting differing 
approaches). 
 116. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977). 
 117. Id. at 425 n.9. 
 118. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and 
Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 810 (2002) (recognizing that Chevron is “more rule-like” 
than Skidmore but is nevertheless a standard rather than a rule); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond 
Marbury: The Executive’s Power To Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2590 (2006) 
(describing Chevron as “a simple rule, to the effect that delegations of rule-making power 
implicitly include the power to interpret ambiguities”). 
 119. See, e.g., Hemel & Nielson, supra note 102, at 760 (“In the classic Chevron two-step, the 
court asks at Step One ‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue’; if 
[not], then the court proceeds to Chevron Step Two and asks ‘whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.’” (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984))). 
 120. Occasionally, the Court suggests Chevron may only have one step: Is the agency’s 
interpretation reasonable? See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 n.4 
(2009). Yet most of the time, the Court articulates the two-step version. E.g., Encino Motorcars, 
LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2124 (2016) (recognizing “two-step analysis set forth in 
Chevron”). 
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question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of 
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court 
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question 
at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative 
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.121 
The key move in Chevron was to “posit[] that courts have a duty 
to defer to reasonable agency interpretations not only when Congress 
expressly delegates interpretative authority to an agency, but also 
when Congress is silent or leaves ambiguity in a statute that an agency 
is charged with administering.”122 Whether Chevron reflects a break 
from past practice is debated—though the fact that Chevron may be 
the most cited administrative law opinion of all time123 and the fact that 
knowledgeable experts soon after Chevron was decided recognized it 
as an important change124 together suggest that the Court did actually 
say something new.  
Why did the Court do this? Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for 
the Court, offered at least three (overlapping) justifications.125 First, 
Stevens invoked accountability, explaining that when a statute contains 
an ambiguity, “it is entirely appropriate for” the agency, as part of a 
“political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—
resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either 
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the 
agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of 
everyday realities.”126 Second, Stevens relied on an agency’s potential 
comparative advantage about how best to balance competing 
demands, explaining that judges “are not experts,” at least as to 
 
 121. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 122. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 29, at 833. 
 123. See Hemel & Nielson, supra note 102, at 772 (“Chevron . . . is by most measures the most 
frequently cited case in administrative law.”).  
 124. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 39, at 512; Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron—The Intersection 
of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 823 (1990). 
 125. See, e.g., Hemel & Nielson, supra note 102, at 773. 
 126. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66. 
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policy.127 And third, perhaps most controversially, Stevens attempted 
to tie this deference to congressional will, arguing that Congress, at 
some point, had made an “implicit” delegation.128  
Not everyone is persuaded by the Court’s analysis. In particular, 
many have questioned Justice Stevens’s third premise regarding 
implicit delegations. It is doubtful that Congress, when drafting 
legislation, contemplates the standard of review courts should use in 
evaluating agency interpretations thereof129—although Congress may 
act deliberately when it uses open-ended, discretion-suggesting words 
like “reasonable” and gives agencies power to exercise that discretion 
through legally binding rulemaking or adjudication.130 Some likewise 
believe that the mandate of de novo review for questions of law 
contained in § 706 of the APA is irreconcilable with Chevron 
deference.131 Suffice it to say, whether Chevron correctly understood 
the history of deference, the constitutional questions deference poses, 
and what Congress intended are all fertile grounds for spirited 
disagreement.  
D. Articulating Chevron’s Domain 
Even if Chevron should exist, it does not follow that the Supreme 
Court’s two-step analysis should apply to all ambiguous texts. When 
Chevron ought to apply, therefore, is another important question—
 
 127. Id. at 865. There is no obvious reason why agencies would have a comparative advantage 
when it comes to legal interpretation, which is a key argument against Chevron. In other words, 
why assume that Congress intended a policy choice at all? 
 128. Id. at 843–44. 
 129. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Revisiting Congressional Delegation of Interpretive Primacy 
as the Foundation for Chevron Deference, 24 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 3, 7 (2016). But see Abbe R. 
Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of 
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 994 (2013) 
(arguing that Congress acts against Chevron’s backdrop).  
 130. See, e.g., Bednar & Hickman, supra note 23, at 1447.  
 131. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018) (“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, 
the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action.”); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“Never mentioning § 706’s directive that the ‘reviewing court . . . interpret . . . 
statutory provisions,’ we have held that agencies may authoritatively resolve ambiguities in 
statutes.” (quoting § 706)); see also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial 
Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 194–95 (1998) (explaining that “commentators in administrative law 
have ‘generally acknowledged’ that Section 706 seems to require de novo review on questions of 
law” (quoting Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 473 n.85 (1989))). 
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albeit one that, at least for a long time, did not receive as much 
attention as the existential question.132 Notably, in Christensen v. Harris 
County133 in 2000, a divided Court concluded that not all reasonable 
interpretations of ambiguous language merit Chevron deference.134  
Justice Thomas for the Court focused on the procedural format in 
which the interpretation was announced, particularly how the agency’s 
interpretation was developed as well as the legal force it carried. As the 
Court explained: 
[P]etitioners and the United States contend that we should defer to 
the Department of Labor’s opinion letter, which takes the position 
that an employer may compel the use of compensatory time only if 
the employee has agreed in advance to such a practice. Specifically, 
they argue that the agency opinion letter is entitled to deference 
under our decision in Chevron . . . . Here, however, we confront an 
interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after, 
for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters—like 
interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and 
enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not 
warrant Chevron-style deference.135 
That limitation on Chevron’s domain drew a sharp rebuke from 
Justice Antonin Scalia, who would (generally) defer to any 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute administered by an agency, so 
long as “it represents the authoritative view of the [agency].”136 Scalia 
believed that Chevron’s domain was vastly greater than that envisioned 
by Justice Thomas. But Scalia did not draw a precise line between 
which interpretations he would consider authoritative and which he 
would not, nor did he indicate whether he would find no persuasive 
value whatsoever in a nonauthoritative interpretation. Regardless, 
through Thomas’s majority opinion and separate dissenting opinions 
by Justices Breyer and Stevens, the rest of the Court appeared to 
conclude that the proper deference for agency interpretations 
announced through less formal means is so-called “Skidmore” 
 
 132. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 29, at 835 (“Throughout most of the post-Chevron 
period, the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have paid little attention to the problem of 
defining the scope of the Chevron doctrine.”). 
 133. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 134. Id. at 587. 
 135. Id. at 586–87.  
 136. Id. at 591 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
HICKMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2021  5:14 PM 
956  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:931 
deference, which commands reviewing courts to defer to the extent 
that an agency’s interpretation is persuasive.137 Because of the 
splintered nature of the Christensen decision, however, it was unclear 
to Court watchers what the future would portend.  
Justice Scalia saw what was coming, however, and tried to cut it 
off. Scalia was the Court’s most fervent advocate of the simple version 
of Chevron. Over his objections, however, the very next year, in 2001, 
the Court concluded that Scalia’s preferred simplified version of 
Chevron is an oversimplification. In Mead, the Court unequivocally 
added complexity to the basic Chevron two-step framework and at 
least partly defined Chevron’s domain by holding that only the subset 
of agency interpretations that carry the force and effect of law receive 
Chevron deference, while interpretations that lack such legal force, at 
most, receive the lesser Skidmore deference.138 Likewise, and especially 
relevant to this Article, the Mead Court held that even agency 
decisions with legal effect do not uniformly receive Chevron 
deference.139 
Although not as well-known as Chevron, the facts in Mead should 
still be familiar to lawyers. The question before the Court was whether 
“a tariff classification ruling by the United States Customs Service 
deserves judicial deference.”140 The Customs Service issues “tariff 
rulings before the entry of goods” by means of so-called “‘ruling 
letters.’”141 Such ruling letters, while binding the direct recipient, do not 
bind anyone else.142 They also, at least generally, are not the product of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication and can be 
changed by the agency without any sort of public participation.143 
Moreover, there is no single entity responsible for issuing all such 
letters. Instead, each of the agency’s dozens of “port-of-entry” offices 
 
 137. See id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.) (“Justice Scalia may well be 
right that the position of the Department of Labor, set forth in both brief and letter, is an 
‘authoritative’ agency view that warrants deference under [Chevron]. But I do not object to the 
majority’s citing [Skidmore] instead.” (citations omitted)); id. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting, 
joined by Ginsburg, J. and Breyer, J.) (“Because there is no reason to believe that the 
Department’s opinion was anything but thoroughly considered and consistently observed, it 
unquestionably merits our respect.”). 
 138. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001). 
 139. See id. at 234–35. 
 140. Id. at 221. 
 141. Id. at 222. 
 142. See id. at 223. 
 143. See id. 
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may do so, as can the agency’s headquarters. Notably, “[m]ost ruling 
letters contain little or no reasoning, but simply describe goods and 
state the appropriate category and tariff.”144 In other words, the facts 
in Mead differed greatly from those in Chevron. Whereas Chevron 
involved hierarchical, notice-and-comment rulemaking by the EPA, 
Mead confronted a scheme in which dozens of entities may interpret 
language through hearing-free adjudications.  
The Supreme Court concluded that the Chevron two-step does not 
apply to tariff classification ruling letters.145 But the Court was 
unwilling to say that interpretations announced in informal 
adjudications are per se ineligible for Chevron deference.146 Instead, 
the Court offered a two-part standard: “In reviewing an ‘administrative 
implementation of a particular statutory provision,’” a court should 
“defer to the agency’s decision (1) ‘when it appears that Congress 
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the 
force of law,’ and (2) ‘the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.’”147 For the first prong, it 
is important that Congress authorized the agency to make binding 
decisions; for the second, courts focus on the “form and context” of the 
agency’s interpretation.148 Per Mead, if the agency’s interpretation is 
the product of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal 
adjudication, the case for Chevron is very strong; otherwise, an agency 
seeking deference has a much more difficult task.149 
 
 144. Id. at 224.  
 145. See id. at 234 (“In sum, classification rulings . . . are beyond the Chevron pale.”). 
 146. See id. at 230–31 (“[A]s significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron 
authority, the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found 
reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was required and 
none was afforded.” (citation omitted)).  
 147. See Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 F.3d 1235, 1246 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27).  
 148. Id. at 1246; see also id. at 1246–47 (“Delegation of such authority may be shown in a 
variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.” (quoting Mead, 
533 U.S. at 227)).  
 149. Indeed, since deciding Mead, although opinions of the Supreme Court have suggested in 
dicta a broader scope for Chevron’s applicability, the Court has only actually extended Chevron 
deference to notice-and-comment regulations and adjudications that arguably could be classified 
as formal. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 547–49 
(2014) [hereinafter Hickman, Three Phases] (surveying post-Mead applications of Chevron by the 
Supreme Court). 
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The upshot is that, although stating that Chevron applies to formal 
adjudications,150 Mead was much more restrained about informal 
adjudications. Indeed, the Court was largely silent on this subject. The 
majority cited—with a “see, e.g.”—a single case concerning an 
informal adjudication.151 The Court also suggested that a lack of 
procedure alone does not preclude Chevron deference.152 Of course, 
the Court declined to review the informal adjudication at bar—the 
tariff ruling letter—using the Chevron standard. The Court had 
nothing to say about which informal adjudications might be Chevron-
eligible.  
Returning then to the APA’s “Four Boxes,” the Mead analysis—
at least on the surface—is as follows: 
TABLE 3: THE APA’S FOUR CATEGORIES WITH MEAD 
 
Formal Informal 
Rulemaking Chevron Deference Chevron Deference 
Adjudication Chevron Deference Mead Two-Step Analysis  
Similarly, using the categories that more accurately reflect the 
contemporary reality of agency decisionmaking, the analysis is as 
follows: 
 
 150. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 (“[T]he overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron 
deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.”). 
 151. See id. at 231 (“[W]e have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when 
no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded.” (citing NationsBank of 
N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–57, 263 (1995))). In NationsBank, 
the Court deferred to an interpretation announced in an informal adjudication by the Comptroller 
of the Currency. See NationsBank, 514 U.S. at 254 (“We are satisfied that the Comptroller’s 
construction of the Act is reasonable and therefore warrants judicial deference.”).  
 152. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 231.  
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TABLE 4: A REALISTIC VIEW WITH MEAD 
 
Formal Informal 
Rulemaking Chevron Deference  
(to the extent relevant) 
Chevron Deference 








This seemingly simple breakdown, however, ignores the 
complexity generated by post-Mead developments. 
E. Post-Mead Guidance 
Since the Supreme Court decided Mead, fights over its meaning 
and other questions regarding Chevron’s scope have continued 
unabated. Mead, of course, has been the focus of a great deal of 
scholarly attention.153 Unfortunately, the Court’s post-Mead 
jurisprudence regarding Chevron’s domain has been inconsistent. 
In Barnhart v. Walton,154 for instance, in an opinion for the Court 
by Justice Breyer, the Court deferred under Chevron to the Social 
Security Administration’s interpretation announced in a notice-and-
comment rulemaking partly because the interpretation was of a “‘long-
standing’ duration.”155 Echoing Mead, the Barnhart Court also stated 
that use of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication was 
not always necessary for Chevron deference.156 Breyer went on to 
suggest that Chevron deference would be due to less formal agency 
pronouncements based on “the interstitial nature of the legal question, 
the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to 
the administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, 
and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over 
 
 153. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1449–50 (2005); Hickman, Three Phases, supra note 149, at 527; Adrian 
Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 350–51 (2003).  
 154. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) (quoting N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 
512, 522 n.12 (1982)). 
 155. Barnett & Walker, supra note 29, at 13 (citing Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 219–20). 
 156. See Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222. 
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a long period of time.”157 Taking that dicta seriously, some courts have 
treated Barnhart as providing a multifactor approach to ascertaining 
an agency’s intention to exercise delegated authority to act with the 
force of law at Mead’s second step—arguably broadening Chevron’s 
domain.158 
The Court also expanded Chevron’s scope with its decision in 
National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet 
Services,159 concluding that agencies using Chevron-eligible formats 
could overturn contrary circuit court interpretations of ambiguous 
statutes.160 Brand X involved a notice-and-comment rulemaking 
wherein the Federal Communications Commission adopted an 
interpretation of the Communications Act that contradicted an earlier 
decision of the Ninth Circuit. Recognizing that such interpretations 
ordinarily are Chevron-eligible under Mead, the Court announced that 
Chevron deference trumps stare decisis when an agency-administered 
statute is ambiguous and contrary judicial precedent merely announces 
the court’s preferred, rather than required, construction. Because the 
Ninth Circuit precedent at issue met that description, the Court, in an 
opinion penned by Justice Thomas, held that Chevron was appropriate. 
“[A]llowing a judicial precedent to foreclose an agency from 
interpreting an ambiguous statute . . . would allow a court’s 
interpretation to override an agency’s. Chevron’s premise is that it is 
for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps.”161 
On the other hand, in King v. Burwell,162 the Court demonstrated 
that use of notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures alone is 
insufficient to establish eligibility for Chevron deference. Citing FDA 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.163 and Utility Air Regulatory 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. See, e.g., Atrium Med. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 766 F.3d 560, 572–73 
(6th Cir. 2014); Fournier v. Sebelius, 718 F.3d 1110, 1121 (9th Cir. 2013); Managed Pharmacy Care 
v. Sebelius, 716 F.3d 1235, 1247 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 159. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 160. See id. at 982–83.  
 161. Id. at 983. Justice Thomas more recently has expressed doubts about the validity of his 
reasoning in Brand X. See Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 691 (2020) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Mem.) (“Brand X appears to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation.”). 
 162. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 163. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
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Group v. EPA,164 two so-called “major questions” or “major rules” 
cases,165 Chief Justice Roberts explained that although the Court will 
“often apply the two-step framework announced in Chevron,” in 
“extraordinary cases,” the Court may opt to sidestep the Chevron 
analysis.166 There, the question was whether Congress’s decision in the 
Affordable Care Act to allow states to receive federal subsidies for 
health care exchanges also allowed the federal government to receive 
those same subsidies. The Court concluded that subsidies were 
available on federal exchanges too but did so without deferring to the 
Internal Revenue Service: 
Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a 
question of deep “economic and political significance” that is central 
to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question 
to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly. It is especially 
unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, 
which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this 
sort.167 
Although the exact contours of the major questions doctrine are 
not pellucid, courts should expect to decide some subset of especially 
significant interpretative questions for themselves without deference. 
This is an obvious example of narrowing Chevron’s domain, limiting 
Chevron’s scope not only by reference to an agency’s choice of 
procedural category (as in Mead), but also by the nature and 
importance of the substantive question at stake. The Court’s post-
Mead decisions have turned pre-Mead cases like Brown & Williamson, 
which rejected deference for especially important regulatory decisions, 
into its own doctrine.  
 
 164. Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014). 
 165. See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting that some 
judges use “major questions” while others use “major rules”); see also Justice Kavanaugh 
describing the same:  
In a series of important cases over the last 25 years, the Supreme Court has required 
clear congressional authorization for major agency rules of this kind. The Court, 
speaking through Justice Scalia, recently summarized the major rules doctrine in this 
way: “We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions 
of vast ‘economic and political significance.’”  
Id. at 417 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp., 573 U.S. at 324).  
 166. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89. 
 167. Id. at 2489 (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp., 573 U.S. at 324). 
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Another limit on Chevron’s domain comes from what one of us 
dubs Chevron Step-One-and-a-Half.168 Under this doctrine, which the 
D.C. Circuit has elucidated at length169 and which the Supreme Court 
appears to have adopted as well, albeit with less analysis,170 an agency 
cannot receive Chevron deference unless it acknowledges the 
ambiguity. “In other words, the agency will lose if it mistakenly says 
that the issue can be resolved at Chevron Step One while the court 
determines that it should be resolved at Chevron Step Two.”171 
Although Step-One-and-a-Half has its share of critics,172 this limit on 
Chevron’s domain appears to be a meaningful limit on deference.  
Finally, however, with Justice Scalia wielding the pen, the Court 
in City of Arlington v. FCC173 refused to extend the Mead contextual 
approach to so-called jurisdictional questions—that is, statutory 
interpretations that would narrow or expand the scope of an agency’s 
authority.174 Justice Scalia’s essential premise was that “the distinction 
between ‘jurisdictional’ and ‘nonjurisdictional’ interpretations is a 
mirage,” although he then seemed to contradict himself by identifying 
several instances in which the Court had deferred to agency 
jurisdictional interpretations.175 Regardless, the Court’s refusal to 
distinguish jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional questions was hardly 
unconventional.176 Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment but wrote 
separately to reiterate his own context-specific approach to Chevron.177 
 
 168. Hemel & Nielson, supra note 102, at 760–61.  
 169. See id. at 765 n.29 (collecting D.C. Circuit cases including, among others, Peter Pan Bus 
Lines, Inc. v. Federal  Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 471 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) and PDK Laboratories Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 797–98 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). 
 170. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 521 (2009). 
 171. Hemel & Nielson, supra note 102, at 760. 
 172. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint in Administrative Law, 117 COLUM. L. 
REV. 253, 301 (2017). 
 173. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013). 
 174. Id. at 296–97; see also Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1867, 1900–07 (2015) (describing competing definitions of what constitutes a jurisdictional 
question). 
 175. City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 297. 
 176. See, e.g., 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.5 (4th ed. 
2002) (finding in case law more support than not for Chevron deference for jurisdictional 
questions); Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 54, at 234–35 (arguing against excluding jurisdictional 
question).  
 177. See City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 308 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I say that the existence 
of statutory ambiguity is sometimes not enough to warrant the conclusion that Congress has left 
a deference-warranting gap for the agency to fill because our cases make clear that other, 
sometimes context-specific, factors will on occasion prove relevant.”). 
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The Chief Justice dissented and urged the Court to adopt a highly 
contextualized understanding of Chevron.178 Scalia responded harshly 
to these arguments, accusing his dissenting colleagues of seeking to 
eliminate Chevron altogether.179 Yet the Court’s refusal to narrow 
Chevron’s domain in City of Arlington does not mean that the Court is 
content to let the issue alone. Arguably, the Court’s majority opinion 
in King merely repackaged the debate over jurisdictional 
interpretations in major questions terms.180 Meanwhile, turnover in the 
Supreme Court’s personnel since City of Arlington suggests that there 
may be five or more votes now to revisit that decision.181  
Indeed, subsequent to City of Arlington, several Justices have 
signaled their interest in considering other questions regarding 
Chevron’s domain, irrespective of the format used. For instance, 
Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Court, has indicated that Chevron 
deference should not apply when the Department of Justice, which is 
closely connected to the president, disagrees with an independent 
agency about how to read a statute.182 Similarly, as a circuit court judge, 
Gorsuch argued that Chevron deference should not apply when an 
agency has attempted to apply its interpretation retroactively through 
adjudication, at least when the affected individual has a strong reliance 
interest because of an earlier judicial decision.183  
 
 178. See id. at 323 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[E]ven when Congress provides interpretive 
authority to a single agency, a court must decide if the ambiguity the agency has purported to 
interpret with the force of law is one to which the congressional delegation extends.”). 
 179. See id. at 304–06 (majority opinion) (“Make no mistake—the ultimate target here is 
Chevron itself . . . . [W]hat the dissent proposes is a massive revision of our Chevron 
jurisprudence.”). 
 180. See Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell, 
2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 58 (suggesting that “King reflects a careful effort by Chief Justice Roberts 
to accomplish, through alternative framing, a broader curtailment of Chevron’s scope that he 
advocated unsuccessfully two terms earlier in City of Arlington v. FCC”).  
 181. See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, Confessions of an “Anti-Administrativist,” 131 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 1, 2 n.9 (2017) (counting votes). 
 182. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (“[W]hatever argument might 
be mustered for deferring to the Executive on grounds of political accountability, surely it 
becomes a garble when the Executive speaks from both sides of its mouth, articulating no single 
position on which it might be held accountable.”).  
 183. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016).  
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II.  REMOVING ADJUDICATION FROM CHEVRON’S DOMAIN 
Today’s Supreme Court is thinking hard about deference, with 
particular focus on Chevron. But what is the Court going to do with it? 
No one knows—presumably not even the Justices. It is unclear whether 
there are five votes to overrule Chevron, especially given that a 
majority was unwilling to overrule Auer and the Chief Justice, who 
reserved the question in Kisor, has criticized Chevron’s effect but has 
not called for the case to be overruled.184 But the Court may have at 
least five votes to curtail Chevron’s scope. Unfortunately, no one has 
articulated a sensible way to do that. Revisiting precedent without a 
well-considered alternative is a recipe for doctrinal incoherence and 
unintended consequences. We submit that the most principled and 
administrable way to reform Chevron deference is by narrowing its 
domain.  
Specifically, the Court should revisit the notion of deferring to 
statutory interpretations announced by agencies in adjudications. For 
reasons discussed below, our preference would be for courts never to 
defer to agency interpretations announced in adjudications. 
Recognizing, however, that the Court may not be willing to go so far, 
then at a minimum, the Court should categorically eliminate Chevron 
deference for interpretations announced in adjudications that lack 
congressionally imposed formal adjudication procedures—which 
means many if not most Type A and Type B adjudications and all 
informal Type C adjudications. If the Court ever allows Chevron 
deference in the adjudication context, it ought to employ a more robust 
retroactivity analysis.  
A. Adjudication’s Pitfalls 
Chevron deference for agency adjudications generally raises three 
concerns. First, deferring to agency interpretations announced in 
adjudications does not align with the rationales often relied upon in 
defending Chevron deference—namely, delegation, expertise, and 
accountability. Second, such deference poses due process concerns. 
Finally, applications of Mead’s test in the adjudication context are, 
quite simply, a mess. Each of these rationales is discussed below. 
 
 184. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part); City 
of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 314–16 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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1. Tension with Chevron’s Theory.  The first reason the Supreme 
Court should narrow Chevron’s domain is that a narrower version is 
more consistent with the reasons why Chevron exists. It is generally 
understood that, when an agency pursues policymaking, public 
participation in the agency’s decisionmaking process yields better 
outcomes, as a matter of both quality and legitimacy. Thus, when an 
agency is making policy choices rather than engaging in mere 
traditional statutory interpretation, rulemaking is superior to 
adjudication. If narrowing Chevron’s domain encourages agencies to 
pursue rulemaking rather than adjudication as their preferred 
policymaking format, the result will be outcomes that are more 
consistent with Chevron’s delegation, expertise, and accountability 
rationales, as well as Chevron’s implicit recognition of a divide between 
interpretation and policy choice.  
Rulemaking and adjudication are different, with perhaps the most 
important distinction being public notice and opportunity for 
comment. Under notice-and-comment rulemaking, an agency must 
provide the public with a “notice of proposed rule making” discussing 
“the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the 
subjects and issues involved” and “give interested persons an 
opportunity to participate . . . through submission of written data, 
views, or arguments . . . .”185 Likewise, agencies must provide the public 
with the data supporting its proposal186 and respond to all material 
comments—namely, “comments that, if true, would cast real doubt on 
the agency’s decision.”187 And the agency’s final rule must be a “logical 
outgrowth” of its proposed rule, meaning that the agency cannot 
depart too much from the proposal.188  
The idea behind these requirements is twofold. One involves 
quality. Agencies possess more expertise in their respective subject 
matter areas than do courts, but they are not omniscient. Because 
 
 185. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2018). 
 186. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 
superseded by statute, Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1)), as recognized in Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 35, § 6.2.  
 187. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, supra note 68, at 97 (citing City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 
706, 714–15 (D.C. Cir. 2007)); see also HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 35, § 6.5.  
 188. See, e.g., Phillip M. Kannan, The Logical Outgrowth Doctrine in Rulemaking, 48 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 213, 214 (1996); see also HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 35, § 5.3.1 (documenting cases 
applying the logical outgrowth test).  
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agency officials do not have a monopoly on knowledge,189 they develop 
their expertise and improve their decisionmaking by reaching out to 
the public seeking information.190 An idea that sounds good in an 
agency’s conference room may not make sense in the real world, for 
some reason that the agency had not considered. Or an agency’s data 
may be flawed, for some reason that the agency does not know. When 
agencies act with less knowledge—including “unknown unknowns,” 
that is, things that the agency does not know it does not know191—they 
may go astray. Rulemaking’s procedural requirements, which enable 
the public to provide agencies with information, help counteract that 
threat. That is not to say, of course, that notice and comment are always 
necessary to achieve quality agency decisionmaking.192 But all else 
being equal, a process that solicits comments and forces agencies to 
engage with the views of the public should generally lead to better 
policy outcomes.193 To the extent that Chevron is justified by agency 
expertise, much of that expertise comes from the procedures that 
agencies are required to use when they engage in rulemaking.194 
 
 189. See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 5, 12–
13 (2005). This article was originally published by The American Economic Review in 1945. 
 190. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (recognizing 
that one purpose of notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures is “to ‘assure[] that the agency 
will have before it the facts and information relevant to a particular administrative problem, as 
well as suggestions for alternative solutions’” (quoting Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1978))); Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance 
on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and Proposed 
Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 958–60 (1998) (asserting the importance of notice-and-
comment rulemaking for improving agency decisionmaking by developing agency expertise).  
 191. See, e.g., Citizens for Resp. & Ethics v. Dep’t of Educ., 538 F. Supp. 2d 24, 30 n.4 (D.D.C. 
2008) (“More poetically stated: ‘As we know, there are known knowns. There are things we know 
we know. We also know there are known unknowns. That is to say we know there are some things 
we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don’t know we don’t know.’” 
(quoting Sec’y of Def. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Dep’t of Def. News Briefing (Feb. 12, 2002, 11:30 
AM), https://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636 [https://perma.cc/ 
USY7-UJGC])).  
 192. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of 
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 514–15 (2002).  
 193. See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, Optimal Ossification, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1209, 1217 
(2018) [hereinafter Nielson, Optimal Ossification] (explaining that procedures “help ensure 
higher quality regulations”). 
 194. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) 
(explaining that agencies have greater “expertise”).  
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Second, and related, such a process may also be deemed more 
legitimate.195 Although legitimacy can be a fuzzy concept, scholars 
recognize that when certain procedural formalities are met, the 
resulting outcome is more likely to command public support, or at least 
acceptance.196 A process that requires an agency to interact with broad 
segments of society and explain why it has acted in view of concerns 
raised by the general public, all else being equal, typically should yield 
more legitimate outcomes. To be sure, this can go too far; too many 
procedures make it difficult for agencies to accomplish anything.197 But 
as a conceptual matter, procedures that force public interaction should, 
at least generally, result in greater legitimacy.198 To the extent that 
Chevron is justified by notions of legitimacy, which the Court suggested 
by its emphasis on the greater relative political accountability, part of 
that legitimacy presumably also comes from the procedures that 
agencies must use, in addition to the fact that elections have 
consequences.199 
These points matter because rulemaking (often200) is superior to 
adjudication on both of these important measures. Although agencies 
sometimes may gain enough information to make optimal policy 
through the adjudicatory process—especially if the adjudication is 
widely publicized and the agency allows nonparties to submit relevant 
information—there is reason to fear that sometimes they do not. 
Adjudications typically involve only a narrow group of parties. 
Likewise, although adjudication has certain claims to legitimacy of its 
 
 195. See, e.g., Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 718, 718–22 (2016) (reviewing DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014)). 
 196. See, e.g., Nielson, Optimal Ossification, supra note 193, at 1212 n.14 (citing Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1795 (2005)). 
 197. See id. at 1231 (explaining this limit on the principle). 
 198. See, e.g., McKinley, supra note 45, at 1538. 
 199. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (1984) (explaining that “[w]hile agencies are not 
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this 
political branch of the Government to make such policy choices”). 
 200. “Often” does not mean “always.” For certain types of decisions, formal adjudication (or 
formal rulemaking, for that matter) may be superior, especially for technical issues. As one of us 
has explained elsewhere in a related context, cross-examination—which exists in formal 
rulemaking and formal adjudication but not in informal rulemaking or informal adjudication—
has important benefits, both in terms of quality and legitimacy. See Nielson, In Defense of Formal 
Rulemaking, supra note 69, at 279–80.  
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own (trials are important for a reason),201 when compared at least with 
informal adjudication (which requires almost no procedures), the 
rulemaking process results in more legitimate outcomes, at least in the 
sense of legitimacy based on public accountability.  
When all of this is put together, the argument for narrowing 
Chevron’s domain is straightforward. To the extent that the Court has 
justified Chevron on pragmatic grounds, the pragmatic argument for it 
is stronger in the rulemaking context, where, at least as compared to 
informal adjudication, we should expect higher-quality outcomes that 
command greater legitimacy. Thus, the case for Chevron carries the 
most weight in the rulemaking context, which, again, describes 
Chevron itself.  
At the same time, there is another important theoretical reason 
why Chevron should not apply in the adjudication context. The Court’s 
current posture of extending Chevron deference to some adjudications, 
but not others, based on the procedures used allows agencies to 
bootstrap their way into Chevron deference. Nothing in the theoretical 
justifications for Chevron, however, supports the bizarre idea that 
agencies, not Congress, can choose whether deference is available. 
Again, Mead predicates eligibility for Chevron deference on 
congressional delegation of authority to act with the force and effect of 
law. As Mead makes clear, the mere presence of statutory ambiguity 
alone is inadequate to demonstrate that Congress has made such a 
delegation. Something more is required, and in the ordinary course, the 
Court has relied upon the agency’s procedures. As noted above, in the 
rulemaking context, Congress tends to be quite clear in granting 
agencies the authority to adopt legally binding regulations. Agencies 
seeking to adopt legally binding regulations are bound by the APA to 
follow notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, unless Congress 
has imposed alternative procedures. Thus, both the delegation of 
authority to act with legal force and the procedures used for doing so 
are found in statutory text.  
Adjudication is different. Congress rarely expressly requires the 
formal adjudication procedures imposed by the APA. Congress often 
merely calls for a “hearing” without specifying the procedures it means 
 
 201. See id. at 279 (“[W]hile trials clearly are intended to serve instrumental values as devices 
for determining the ‘truth’ . . . they also serve other, interrelated values, including participatory, 
dignitary, educational, and legitimating values.” (quoting Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, 
Administrative Procedure and the Decline of the Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 504 (2003))). 
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the agency to follow. In such circumstances, courts in the post-Chevron 
era are more inclined to let the agency decide what procedures it will 
follow.202 The purported basis for this approach comes from the 
Supreme Court’s Florida East Coast Railway203 doctrine, which holds 
that unless an agency’s organic statute calls for rulemaking “on the 
record,” informal rulemaking procedures are sufficient.204 In 
addressing adjudication, the APA uses nearly identical “on the record” 
phrasing as the language interpreted by the Court in Florida East Coast 
Railway with respect to rulemaking.205 Yet, the Justices have never 
addressed when the APA’s formal adjudication procedures are 
required.  
In response to this gap in Supreme Court precedent, for many 
years, the circuit courts struggled to decide whether to follow the same 
approach in evaluating if an agency should use formal adjudication 
procedures under the APA.206 Although the APA prescribes 
alternative procedures for informal rulemaking (in other words, notice 
and comment), the APA imposes very few procedural requirements 
for informal adjudication. This concerns some courts. Thus, despite 
Florida East Coast Railway, in decisions predating Chevron by several 
years, the First and Ninth Circuits adopted a presumption in favor of 
the APA’s formal adjudication procedures.207 The Second and Seventh 
Circuits followed the reasoning of Florida East Coast Railway in 
adopting the opposite presumption, however, effectively leaving the 
choice of procedures to the agencies themselves.208  
Since the Supreme Court decided Chevron, including in the years 
after Mead, that landscape has moved even further in favor of agency 
choice. Several years after the Supreme Court decided Chevron, the 
D.C. Circuit held that a statutory reference to a “public hearing” 
 
 202. See HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 35, § 6.2 (explaining the history). 
 203. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). 
 204. See id. at 240–41 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2018)); see also Nielson,  In Defense of 
Formal Rulemaking, supra note 69, at 251–53 (describing the case).  
 205. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (calling for the APA to apply “in every case of adjudication 
required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing”). 
 206. See HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 35, § 6.1. 
 207. See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 878 (1st Cir. 1978), 
superseded by rule, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 
(2005), as recognized in Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 
2006); Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1264 (9th Cir. 1977).  
 208. See City of West Chi. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 701 F.2d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 1983); 
AT&T Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 21–22 (2d Cir. 1978). 
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without additional guidance regarding the procedures to be used 
represents an ambiguity that the agency may resolve by adopting its 
own procedures.209 An agency’s conclusion that a statutory hearing 
reference does not require APA formal adjudication procedures, and 
the adjudication procedures the agency adopts instead to resolve that 
ambiguity, are eligible for Chevron deference.210 Since the Court 
decided Mead, the First Circuit explicitly adopted this same 
conclusion.211 Notably, the First Circuit cited Brand X as the impetus 
for replacing its previous presumption with Chevron deference for the 
agency’s procedural choices.212  
This jurisprudential shift also should make a significant difference 
in how courts think about Mead and Chevron deference for agency 
adjudications more generally. As a growing number of circuits give 
agencies considerably more control over the procedures used for 
adjudication, they simultaneously allow agencies to choose whether 
the interpretations they advance through those adjudications will 
receive Chevron deference. If the agency chooses formal adjudication 
procedures under the APA, then courts will extend Chevron 
deference. The same may be true if the agency chooses procedures that 
strongly resemble but are not quite the same as APA formal 
adjudication.213 If the agency chooses substantially less formal 
adjudication procedures, Chevron deference is less likely. Regardless, 
it is the agency rather than Congress that is making the procedural 
choice, and thus it is the agency that is choosing the deference standard 
 
 209. See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting 42  
U.S.C. § 6928(b) (1982)).  
 210. See id.  
 211. See Dominion Energy, 443 F.3d at 18–19; see also Crestview Parke Care Ctr. v. 
Thompson, 373 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the statute and implementing 
regulations clearly require APA formal adjudication with oral hearings but deferring under the 
Auer standard to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations to allow for summary 
adjudications without oral hearings in some circumstances as making good policy sense). 
 212. Dominion Energy, 443 F.3d at 17. 
 213. Notably, the Supreme Court has not clearly articulated what it means by formal 
adjudication as it used the term in Mead. Did the Court mean to refer only to the formal 
adjudication procedures prescribed by the APA—that is, Professor Asimow’s Type A 
adjudication? Or did the Court mean to be more inclusive of Professor Asimow’s Type B 
adjudications, whether or not the procedures used align precisely with those of the APA’s formal 
adjudication category? This question matters because, if the applicability of the APA’s formal 
adjudication procedures does not drive the analysis, but rather only an agency’s use of certain 
procedures, agencies may be able to game their way further through the Mead two-step analysis 
by adding some but not all of the formal adjudication procedures required by the APA. 
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that flows from those procedures. This ability for an agency to choose 
its own deference standard creates opportunities for strategic behavior 
that the Court did not contemplate in Mead, much less in Chevron 
itself. Such bootstrapping potential is in substantial tension with the 
delegation premise for Chevron deference advanced by the Mead 
Court.  
2. “Due Process” Concerns.  A second reason to narrow Chevron’s 
domain to exclude agency adjudications sounds in overlapping 
concepts such as due process, fairness, and the rule of law. Simply put, 
agency adjudications impose present legal consequences for past 
actions, making deference in such instances retroactive in its 
orientation and undermining reliance interests.214 By comparison, 
agency rulemaking typically is prospective. Deference with retroactive 
application is much harder to defend than deference applied only 
prospectively.  
Consider, for example, the circumstances of Alfonzo De Niz 
Robles and Hugo Rosario Gutierrez-Brizuela. In 2005, the Tenth 
Circuit concluded that the U.S. attorney general had discretion to 
adjust the status of certain immigrants.215 Relying on that decision, De 
Niz Robles and Gutierrez-Brizuela petitioned the federal government 
for such relief.216 Yet later, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
concluded that, in fact, such relief was unlawful, and then applied that 
rule to declare De Niz Robles, Gutierrez-Brizuela, and others like 
them as “categorically ineligible for an adjustment of status and subject 
to removal” from the United States.217 Given the statutory ambiguity 
and a reasonable BIA interpretation, as the Tenth Circuit conceded in 
this instance, Chevron and Brand X compel judicial deference to the 
agency. Recognizing the due process implications as “obvious,” the 
Tenth Circuit declined to apply the BIA’s interpretation retroactively 
to De Niz Robles and Gutierrez-Brizuela because “the retroactive 
 
 214. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 220 (1998) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Qwest Servs. Corp. v. FCC, 509 F.3d 531, 539–40 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting the 
“presumption of retroactivity for adjudications”).  
 215. See Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 1294, 1299–1301 (10th Cir. 2005), amended and 
superseded on reh’g, 453 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2006).  
 216. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1144–45 (10th Cir. 2016); De Niz Robles 
v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 217. See De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1167–68 (documenting history, including In re Briones, 24 
I. & N. Dec. 355 (B.I.A. 2007)). 
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application of new penalties to past conduct that affected persons 
cannot now change denies them fair notice of the law and risks 
endowing a decisionmaker expressly influenced by majoritarian 
politics with the power to single out disfavored individuals for 
mistreatment.”218 Not all similarly situated litigants have been so 
fortunate.219  
Of course, part of the theory driving Chevron deference is the 
notion that agencies are better positioned than courts to resolve 
statutory questions that are more a matter of policy choice than 
resolvable using traditional tools of statutory interpretation. In a line 
of cases dating back to Chenery II, the Supreme Court recognized that 
agencies sometimes can make policy through adjudication as well as 
through rulemaking and that the choice between those procedures is 
for agencies rather than courts to make.220 It does not follow, however, 
that an agency’s choice of adjudication rather than rulemaking as the 
vehicle for pronouncing its interpretation of a statute should 
automatically entitle the agency to Chevron deference. Indeed, 
policymaking in adjudication should be different in kind from 
policymaking through rulemaking. Although retroactive policymaking 
need not always be troubling,221 it certainly can be, especially given 
bedrock principles such as fair notice.222 Justice Robert Jackson, hardly 
a reactionary, once condemned such retroactivity as administrative 
“lawlessness,”223 and the Court has repeatedly stressed that 
retroactivity can raise concerns about fair notice.224 
 
 218. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1146 (citing De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1169–70). 
 219. See, e.g., Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 520–23 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 220. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947); see also, e.g., Qwest Servs. 
Corp. v. FCC, 509 F.3d 531, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (restating the black-letter rule from Chenery II 
that “a mere lack of clarity in the law does not make it manifestly unjust to apply a subsequent 
clarification of that law to past conduct”). 
 221. See NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (allowing the agency to 
announce policy retroactively via adjudication because the agency’s reading of the relevant law 
was objectively the most reasonable). 
 222. See Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. & Blaine H. Evanson, The Enduring and Universal 
Principle of “Fair Notice,” 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 204 (2013) (explaining that the principle of 
“fair notice . . . is deeply rooted in our legal system”); Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 542, 543 (2009) (explaining that “fair notice has been recognized as an essential element 
of the rule of law” for centuries). 
 223. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 217 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 224. See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 158 (2012) (“[W]here, 
as here, an agency’s announcement of its interpretation is preceded by a very lengthy period of 
conspicuous inaction, the potential for unfair surprise is acute.”); Martin v. Occupational Safety 
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The Supreme Court’s treatment of Auer or Seminole Rock225 
deference is consistent with this position.226 In recent years, the Court 
has been concerned about agencies receiving deference when 
interpreting their own regulations. Often, the context in which such 
interpretation occurs involves agency adjudication, as in Kisor. The 
concern is that agencies will unfairly spring new obligations on 
unsuspecting parties via retroactive adjudication.227 Although Kisor 
upheld Auer against an all-out challenge that it should be overruled, 
Justice Elena Kagan pointedly acknowledged that “unfair surprise” is 
a reason to deny deference.228 It is unfair to make someone suffer for 
not predicting a new policy.229  
Yet that concern, at bottom, is not limited to agency 
interpretations of regulations. After all, there often is not much 
conceptual difference between amending a regulation and 
reinterpreting a regulation. The real concern arises when such 
amendment or reinterpretation occurs retroactively. But that rule-of-
law apprehension, sounding in basic fairness, is not limited to 
retroactive interpretations of regulations; it also applies to retroactive 
interpretations of statutes.230 The same principle of unfairness that 
drove the Court’s move in Kisor to limit Auer and “Seminole Rock’s 
domain”231 also should lead the Court to limit Chevron’s domain. In 
either context, the Court should worry about (relatively) aggressive 
policymaking in adjudication, which deference inherently enables.  
 
& Health Rev. Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 158, (1991) (highlighting “adequacy of notice to regulated 
parties”). 
 225. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
 226. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (restating the deference rule from 
Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414). 
 227. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 620 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that when “the power to prescribe is augmented by the 
power to interpret” an “incentive” emerges “to speak vaguely and broadly, so as to retain a 
‘flexibility’ that will enable ‘clarification’ with retroactive effect”). 
 228. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2421 (2019). 
 229. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in 
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 535 (2003) (explaining that “Chenery II is 
troubling” and “provides far more opportunities for abuse [in today’s world] than it did in 1947”). 
 230. Nielson, Seminole Rock, supra note 62, at 996 (“[O]nce we realize that the separation-
of-powers concern, at its core, is retroactivity, there is no reason why the same sort of . . . 
argument . . . would not also apply to Chevron in adjudications.”). 
 231. Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1449, 1451 (2011).  
HICKMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2021  5:14 PM 
974  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:931 
Importantly, even if these retroactivity concerns do not rise to the 
level of outright unconstitutionality, they nonetheless affect 
perceptions regarding the fairness and political legitimacy of agency 
actions. Thus, due process concerns, even when they do not amount to 
a constitutional violation, have long been understood to limit what 
agencies can do.232 There is, and should be, something off-putting about 
creating new duties and then applying those duties to past conduct, a 
practice that can be “literally Orwellian.”233 And there are certainly 
examples where the unfairness is palpable, as Justice Gorsuch 
explained.234 Hence, rulemaking should be the favored policymaking 
tool.235  
Indeed, retroactively announcing policy via adjudication presents 
two types of overlapping concerns—what we call “Due Process” and 
“due process,” with the former being actual constitutional violations 
and the latter being the sort of government action that, while perhaps 
constitutional, nonetheless requires a clear statement from Congress 
because of its tension with traditional understandings of fairness and 
the rule of law. Both Due Process and due process matter. For instance, 
there often is no constitutional prohibition on retroactive rulemaking; 
Congress can authorize it.236 Yet courts understandably are reluctant 
to conclude that Congress has done so.237 Part of that concern stems 
 
 232. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“This [due process] 
requirement has now been thoroughly ‘incorporated into administrative law.’” (quoting Satellite 
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1987))); Rollins Env’t Servs. (NJ), Inc. v. EPA, 937 
F.2d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“It is a 
simple principle of administrative law that, in adopting administrative regulations, an agency ‘has 
the responsibility to state with ascertainable certainty what is meant by the standards . . . 
promulgated.’” (quoting Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 
528 F.2d 645, 649 (5th Cir. 1976))). 
 233. NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 122 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing GEORGE 
ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 102–03 (1946)). 
 234. See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1225 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (“Perhaps the most basic of due process’s customary protections 
is the demand of fair notice.”). 
 235. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (“The function of filling 
in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-
legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future.”). 
 236. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“[C]ongressional 
enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their 
language requires this result.”). 
 237. See, e.g., Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Dep’t of Lab., 292 F.3d 849, 859 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“An 
agency may not promulgate retroactive rules absent express congressional authority.”); 
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from the ordinary meaning of the word “rule” itself, which suggests 
prospectivity. But part of it also stems from the background fact that 
the law recognizes the unfairness and disruptive effects of 
retroactivity.238 
Somewhere between Due Process and due process, moreover, is 
constitutional avoidance, in which the Court assumes that Congress did 
not intend to push the constitutional line absent some clear statement 
from Congress.239 Because retroactivity poses such concerns, and 
because Congress has not expressly authorized Chevron in any 
context,240 it follows that the Court could conclude that this absence of 
a clear statement means that Chevron should not apply to agency 
adjudications.241 The Court should be wary before concluding that 
Congress has authorized agencies to push the limits of due process.242  
 
HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 35, § 3.6 (tracing the relevant case law on congressional 
delegation of authority to an agency). 
 238. See Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208. As the Bowen Court explained:  
  Retroactivity is not favored in the law. Thus, congressional enactments and 
administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their 
language requires this result . . . . By the same principle, a statutory grant of legislative 
rulemaking authority will not, as a general matter, be understood to encompass the 
power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by Congress in 
express terms. 
Id.  
 239. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (explaining that constitutional 
avoidance “is a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, 
resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises 
serious constitutional doubts”). 
 240. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Heedless of the original design of the [Administrative Procedure Act], [the Court 
has] developed an elaborate law of deference to agencies’ interpretations of statutes and 
regulations.”). 
 241. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) (“In traditionally sensitive 
areas . . . the requirement of [a] clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and 
intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.” (quoting Will 
v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989))).  
 242. See, e.g., Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1340–41 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[T]he 
constitutional avoidance canon of statutory interpretation trumps Chevron deference.”); Solid 
Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (“We . . . 
read the statute as written to avoid the significant constitutional and federalism questions raised 
by respondents’ interpretation, and therefore reject the request for administrative deference.”). 
Adrian Vermeule argues that even the protections necessary to uphold due process often are, and 
should be, within an agency’s discretion. For more on this topic, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S 
ABNEGATION 87–88 (2016). Yet courts often express alarm about threats to due process when 
agencies are involved, and recent moves to reinforce the fair notice doctrine suggest a 
reinvigoration of such concerns. See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 
142, 155–56 (2012) (declining to defer to an agency interpretation of an ambiguous regulation that 
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And make no mistake; the Supreme Court has recognized that 
retroactivity poses such concerns. As the Court explained in 
Christopher, the law recognizes “the principle that agencies should 
provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of the conduct [a regulation] 
prohibits or requires.’”243 The cited authority for that principle was a 
decision from the D.C. Circuit authored by then-Judge Scalia.244 There, 
Scalia observed that “[w]here the imposition of penal sanctions is at 
issue . . . the due process clause prevents [judicial] deference from 
validating the application of a regulation that fails to give fair warning 
of the conduct it prohibits or requires.”245 Although Scalia’s opinion is 
not perfectly clear, it appears that he invoked Due Process—that 
allowing an agency to make important decisions through retroactive 
adjudication fails “for lack of ‘fair’ or ‘constitutionally adequate’ 
warning.”246 The Court in Christopher then enforced that principle 
beyond a narrow penal context.247 The Court has also held, under the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine, that to be constitutional, criminal statutes 
must provide “fair notice.”248 Justice Gorsuch, in turn, explained at 
length why that same standard should apply to civil statutes.249 This 
suggests a Due Process limit on an agency’s ability to create policy 
retroactively, including through use of deference.  
Whether it is Due Process or due process, a clear statement 
requirement should apply when agencies make policy retroactively via 
deference.250 Yet whereas Chevron assumes that silence or ambiguity 
 
would have imposed liability on a company for conduct that occurred before the agency’s 
interpretation). 
 243. Christopher, 567 U.S. at 156  (quoting Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health 
Rev. Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 
 244. Id.  
 245. Gates & Fox Co., 790 F.2d at 156. 
 246. Id.; see also id. (“If a violation of a regulation subjects private parties to criminal or civil 
sanctions, a regulation cannot be construed to mean what an agency intended but did not 
adequately express.” (quoting Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. 
Comm’n, 528 F.2d 645, 649 (5th Cir. 1976))). 
 247. Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155–56 (applying the doctrine in context of a civil dispute 
between private parties). 
 248. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556–57 (2015).  
 249. See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1228 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“I 
cannot see how the Due Process Clause might often require any less than that in the civil context 
either. Fair notice of the law’s demands . . . is ‘the first essential of due process.’” (quoting 
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926))). 
 250. Cf. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320–21 n.45 (2001) (refusing to defer to the agency’s view 
about “a statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application”).  
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equals congressional authorization, a clear statement requirement is 
premised on the opposite theory—that silence equals no congressional 
authorization. And if circumstances exist where both theories would 
seem to apply simultaneously, then one theory must prevail. This 
dynamic, we submit, changes how one should think about Chevron. 
There is less reason in the rulemaking context for a clear statement 
requirement regarding retroactive intent because the policies created 
through rulemaking are almost always prospective.251 By contrast, in 
the context of adjudications, a clear statement rule should apply. To be 
sure, even without deference, announcing new interpretations in 
adjudication creates some retroactivity concerns, as most 
interpretations contain something akin to law creation.252 Yet, of 
course, the retroactivity concerns are heightened with deference.  
3. Administrability Concerns.  A third argument in favor of 
narrowing Chevron’s domain relates to administrability. At least in the 
adjudication context, Mead is a mess. In explaining Mead’s force-of-
law standard, the Court specifically identified an agency’s use of formal 
adjudication procedures, along with notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
as “a very good indicator” of congressional intent that the agency’s 
interpretation would carry the force of law and be eligible for Chevron 
deference.253 The Court went on to emphasize that a lack of such 
procedures is not dispositive, however, and cited a pre-Mead case 
involving Chevron deference to a less formal agency adjudication by 
the Comptroller of the Currency.254 Mead itself involved an informal 
adjudication in the form of a customs ruling letter.255 Yet beyond those 
two very different and isolated examples, the Mead Court did not 
elaborate how to discern which adjudications carry legal force and 
which do not.  
 
 251. Cf., e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 173 (2001) (concluding that federalism’s clear statement rule defeats ambiguity). Of course, 
other clear statement rules may apply, especially if Chevron poses constitutional concerns. Such 
questions are beyond the scope of this Article.  
 252. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (“[A] certain 
degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action.” 
(quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
omitted))). 
 253. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 (2001).  
 254. Id. at 230–31. 
 255. Id. at 230. 
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It is easy to discern whether an agency possesses the authority to 
adopt binding regulations. Statutes often say so by authorizing agency 
officials to adopt “rules and regulations,” both generally as needed and 
to accomplish specific, congressionally identified goals.256 By 
comparison, agency organic statutes contemplating adjudication often 
provide little or no procedural guidance—for example, merely calling 
for a “hearing” with no further indication of the procedures to be used, 
thereby allowing agencies tremendous latitude to determine for 
themselves the procedures they will follow. Consequently, despite 
Mead’s seeming simplicity, it is not at all clear how to determine when 
to apply the Chevron framework to particular adjudications. As then-
Judge Gorsuch explained,  
[T]oday courts will only sometimes apply Chevron deference to 
ambiguous civil statutes. Neither, respectfully, does looking to the 
Supreme Court’s case law supply a great deal of guidance on how to 
apply Mead’s balancing test. In recent years, the Court has declined 
to apply Chevron deference to arguably ambiguous civil statutes but 
it has only sometimes cited the Mead balancing test as the reason, 
leaving more than a few litigants and lower courts to wonder how they 
are supposed to proceed.257  
This criticism is fair, if perhaps overstated. On the one hand, 
judicial opinions are not treatises, and if the Court believes the 
meaning of a statute is clear, then the Court may see little need to recite 
and analyze all of the steps of Mead and Chevron. On the other hand, 
as explained above, the Court has not provided bright lines for 
ascertaining when Chevron applies. The Court has said that Chevron 
applies in rulemaking and formal adjudication contexts. The Court’s 
guidance for informal adjudication has been utterly context dependent. 
Meanwhile, the category of “informal adjudication” is extraordinarily 
broad. Very few agency formats are identical, or even that similar, to 
 
 256. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 293 (2013) (observing that the 
Communications Act of 1934 “empowers the Federal Communications Commission . . . to 
‘prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out [its] 
provisions’” (quoting Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012))); Mayo Found. for 
Med. Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 57 (2011) (finding provision authorizing the 
Treasury Department “to ‘prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement’” of 
that statute “to be ‘a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment’” (first 
quoting the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2006); then quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 
229)). 
 257. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1157 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
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the tariff ruling letter at issue in Mead. Courts are left applying a 
common-law-style analysis, reasoning by analogy. Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to perform that sort of analysis when the Supreme Court has 
applied Mead expressly in only a small number of opinions that do not 
involve rulemaking.258 Thus, lower courts struggle with Mead.259  
Although courts muddle through, the fact that Mead is not easily 
applied in the adjudication context suggests the need for a more bright-
line rule.260 In other contexts, where the Court has recognized that a 
balancing test is hard to apply, it has replaced that test with brighter 
lines. For instance, in the area of jurisdiction, the Court recognized that 
a multifactor test for a corporation’s “principal place of business” 
would be too “complex”; it thus adopted the nerve-center standard.261 
To be sure, the Court should not create a bright-line rule where the law 
itself is not bright. The Court does not have a license to create clarity 
 
 258. Beyond the Mead decision itself, searching the Supreme Court database in Westlaw for 
“533 U.S. 218” and keyciting the Mead decision identified fifty additional cases that cite Mead, 
most of which are also included in the study documented in Part III.A.(i) and the Appendix 
below. Most of those cases either involve notice-and-comment rulemaking (eligible for Chevron 
deference under Mead), see, e.g., City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 293–94, 307; Mayo Found., 562 
U.S. at 50, 55–56; Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45 (2002), or informal guidance 
documents that obviously fall in the rulemaking category (and warrant at most Skidmore 
deference according to Mead), see, e.g., Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship 
Est. of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385–86 (2003) (applying Mead and Skidmore in evaluating the 
Social Security Administration’s Program Operating Manuals System); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 
555, 577 (2009) (applying Mead and Skidmore to a Food and Drug Administration regulatory 
preamble). In several others, the Court either found the statute clear, so did not need to apply 
Mead to discern the appropriate deference standard, see, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 
390–91 (2009); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326–27 (2008), or cited Mead for other 
purposes, see, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414−16 (2019) (citing Mead in drawing 
analogies between Auer and Chevron); Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141 (2019) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing Mead in recognizing that sometimes “‘statutory circumstances’ 
indicate that Congress meant to grant” an agency gap-filling powers). Still others included 
citations to Mead only in concurring or dissenting opinions, raising questions as to whether the 
majority applied Mead as part of its analysis. See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 
535 U.S. 137, 161 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Consequently, the number of cases in which the 
Court has applied Mead to decide whether Chevron or Skidmore provides the appropriate 
evaluative standard for an agency adjudication, whether formal or not, is very small.  
 259. See, e.g., HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 35, § 3.6 (explaining the confusion Mead has 
caused); Bressman, supra note 153, at 1449–50 (reflecting upon the consequences of different 
readings of Mead). 
 260. See generally, e.g., Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140 (1994) 
(explaining the value of coherent doctrine); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (explaining the value of bright-line rules). 
 261. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92, 94 (2010); see id. at 94 (“Complex tests produce 
appeals and reversals, encourage gamesmanship, and, again, diminish the likelihood that results 
and settlements will reflect a claim’s legal and factual merits. Judicial resources too are at stake.”). 
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where the law does not allow it.262 But to the extent that Chevron is, for 
the most part, judicially developed, the Court has greater latitude to 
define its contours.263  
For administrability purposes, therefore, the Court has good 
reason to fashion a brighter line in the context of Chevron’s domain. 
Because Mead is challenging to apply in the adjudication context,264 the 
Court should look for an easier test. Limiting Chevron to formal 
adjudications, while excluding informal adjudications from Chevron’s 
domain, would be an improvement. Yet, as Asimow’s comparison of 
Type A and Type B adjudications suggests, determining whether a 
particular hearing process is an APA formal adjudication as opposed 
to a highly formalized informal adjudication could easily slip into 
asking which highly formalized informal adjudications are formal 
enough, and then we are right back where we started with Mead. For 
this reason, the superior bright-line rule would ask simply whether the 
agency decision is the product of rulemaking or adjudication.  
B. A Narrower Narrowing? 
It is also, of course, possible to have a narrower narrowing of 
Chevron’s domain. The Supreme Court, for instance, could keep the 
two essentially per se categories from Mead—namely, that Chevron 
applies to interpretations announced in rulemaking and formal 
adjudication—while turning Mead’s gray area over informal 
adjudication into another categorical rule of no deference. This 
approach would address many of the concerns with Chevron’s scope 
but would leave more of Mead intact. 
 
 262. See, e.g., Erin Morrow Hawley, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution: Redefining the 
Meaning of Jurisdiction, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2027, 2048–78 (2015) (criticizing efforts to 
create clarity without regard to congressional direction). See generally Gary Lawson & Steven G. 
Calabresi, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483 (2014) (providing 
similar criticisms).  
 263. Cf. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 284 (1998) (“[C]onsiderations 
[by the Court of a statute’s structure and purpose] . . . are pertinent not only to the scope of the 
implied right, but also to the scope of the available remedies.”); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. 
Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 77 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In my view, when rights of action are 
judicially ‘implied,’ categorical limitations upon their remedial scope may be judicially implied as 
well.”). 
 264. See, e.g., HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 35, § 3.6.8 (explaining the difficult question of 
whether Chevron deference should apply to “a non-precedential interpretation announced by a 
single member of [Board of Immigration Appeals]” and the approaches taken by circuit courts). 
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Other potential limitations are worth considering as well. For 
instance, what about formal adjudications where the agency lacks 
rulemaking power, thus taking the case outside of the Chenery II 
framework? The Board of Immigration Appeals is an example. The 
Supreme Court recognized that Chevron deference may apply to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) as early as 1987 in 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.265 As documented below, the Court has 
carried that deference over to the BIA.266 But does deference in this 
context make sense? If Congress has determined that an agency cannot 
engage in rulemaking, is that not a signal that Congress does not want 
the agency to receive deference? In other words, applying Chevron’s 
fiction, what theory would justify deference only for adjudications, 
even though, for all of the reasons explained above, the case for 
Chevron is much weaker in the adjudicatory context? Where Congress 
has concluded that the agency has no authority to promulgate rules, 
the argument that Congress has nonetheless implicitly authorized that 
agency to make policy, with deference, via adjudication is hard to see. 
In an effort to narrow Chevron’s domain, the Supreme Court could 
thus hold that no deference applies for these agencies.  
Similarly, because the forms of adjudication, in practice, are more 
complex than the simple APA model, there is an argument that not all 
formal adjudications should receive per se treatment. For instance, 
single-member BIA decisions are nonprecedential; in other words, 
they do not bind other BIA decisionmakers.267 In that sense, they are 
reminiscent of the customs letters at issue in Mead.268 The difference is 
that the BIA engages in formal adjudication for those decisions, which 
is quite unlike what happened in Mead. Although a maximalist reading 
of Mead may suggest that even nonprecedential formal adjudication is 
enough for Chevron to apply, most circuits only extend Skidmore 
 
 265. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987) (“There is obviously some 
ambiguity in a term like ‘well-founded fear’ which can only be given concrete meaning through a 
process of case-by-case adjudication . . . [and] courts must respect the interpretation of the agency 
to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering the statutory program.”). 
 266. See, e.g., Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 56 (2014) (plurality opinion) 
(“Principles of Chevron deference apply when the BIA interprets the immigration laws.”); see 
also id. at 76 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment) (affording Chevron deference but advocating 
for a more limited scope of the doctrine). 
 267. See HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 35, § 5.2.  
 268. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 222–23 (2001) (stating that ruling letters 
are nonbinding on third parties to the transaction).  
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review to those adjudications.269 At a minimum, the Supreme Court 
should endorse that line of cases. 
Finally, to the extent the Court is reluctant to reject Chevron for 
agencies to which it has granted Chevron deference in the past in the 
context of adjudication, the Court could at least mitigate some the 
above-stated concerns by adopting a more robust approach to 
retroactivity analysis. Justice Kagan’s recognition in Kisor of the 
danger of “unfair surprise” is a good step in that direction, one that the 
Court could take for Chevron too.270  
We believe that each of these options is better than the status quo. 
Yet we also believe that for the reasons set forth above, it would make 
even more sense to eliminate Chevron from the adjudication context 
altogether. These narrower narrowings, in other words, are better than 
nothing, but do not address all of the concerns with Chevron and 
adjudication.  
III.  STARE DECISIS AND CHEVRON’S DOMAIN 
So, what about stare decisis? When the Supreme Court has 
decided a question of law, it should not lightly cast that decision 
aside.271 Here, the Court has already applied Chevron to 
interpretations announced in adjudications. Indeed, in Mead, the 
Court announced a presumption that legal interpretations announced 
through formal adjudications receive Chevron deference.272 And even 
for informal adjudications, the Court suggested that Chevron 
 
 269. See HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 35, § 3.6.  
 270. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2417–18 (2019) (“[A] court may not defer to a new 
interpretation . . . that creates ‘unfair surprise’ to regulated parties.” (quoting Long Island Care 
at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170 (2007))). 
 271. See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015) (explaining that 
“[o]verruling precedent is never a small matter” and “stare decisis means sticking to some wrong 
decisions”); Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 317, 326 n.49 (2005) (explaining that all of the Justices have demonstrated respect for 
stare decisis, at least in some contexts). 
 272. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (“We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation 
meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process 
of . . . adjudication that produces . . . rulings for which deference is claimed.”); see also Edelman 
v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 123 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Mead for the 
proposition of Chevron deference for notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication). 
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sometimes applies.273 Given all of this, how could the Court retreat 
from Chevron deference for agency adjudications now? 
We have three responses. First, adjudication’s claim to Chevron 
deference on stare decisis is actually surprisingly weak. Its rhetoric 
notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has applied Chevron in evaluating 
adjudications only rarely, particularly post-Mead. Other doctrinal 
developments further undermine Chevron’s claim to stare decisis in the 
adjudication context. Second, the Court already has concluded not only 
in Mead but also in Kisor that it does not violate stare decisis to narrow 
a deference doctrine, which is all we advocate here. Finally, if the Court 
cannot identify a principled way to reduce the incidence of Chevron 
deference in circumstances that raise some of the above-acknowledged 
concerns, a majority of the Justices could decide to overrule Chevron 
altogether.  
A. A Weak Stare Decisis Claim 
Stare decisis is an important part of the law.274 But employing 
traditional stare decisis analysis in the context of adjudication, Chevron 
is not entitled to much precedential weight. First, dicta 
notwithstanding, the Supreme Court only rarely has used Chevron in 
evaluating agency adjudications, particularly post-Mead. Additionally, 
other doctrinal developments, already noted above, undermine 
Chevron’s claim to precedential force with respect to agency 
adjudications.  
1. Infrequent Application.  Chevron is a doctrine oriented, first and 
foremost, toward agency rulemaking. The quintessential Chevron case 
is notice-and-comment rulemaking, as Chevron itself concerned such 
an interpretation.275 The rulemaking context also best matches the 
theoretical justifications for Chevron on its own terms. Although 
 
 273. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230–31 (citing as an example NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. 
v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–57 (1995), concerning a Comptroller of 
the Currency informal adjudication).  
 274. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Contemplating a Weaker Auer Standard, YALE J. REGUL.: 
NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 23, 2016), https://yalejreg.com/nc/contemplating-a-weaker-auer-
standard-by-kristin-e-hickman [https://perma.cc/63VH-Q3VW] (noting the importance of stare 
decisis); Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853, 1856–59 (2018) (noting similar). 
 275. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 858–59 (1984) 
(“These conclusions were expressed in a proposed rulemaking in August 1981 that was formally 
promulgated in October.”). 
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agency adjudications far outnumber agency rulemakings,276 
contemporary agencies more often use rulemaking when making 
significant interpretive pronouncements.277 A substantial majority of 
cases in which the Justices have afforded deference involve 
rulemaking.  
By comparison, the Court squeezed agency adjudications into the 
Chevron framework almost as an afterthought. As a theoretical matter, 
the Court’s extension of Chevron’s domain to formal adjudications 
almost certainly derives from its conclusion in Chenery II that an 
agency with both rulemaking and adjudication powers may choose 
between the two formats when exercising policymaking discretion. The 
Court has never said so explicitly, although Chevron itself did cite 
Chenery II as favoring some amount of deference to agency 
interpretations reflecting policy choices.278 Regardless, although the 
Court rhetorically embraced Chevron for some subset of agency 
adjudications, its actual decisions do not reflect that rhetoric.  
From the Chevron decision itself through the end of the October 
2019 term, the Supreme Court cited Chevron in 238 cases.279 Many of 
those cases, however, do not reflect actual applications of Chevron. For 
example, the Court cited Chevron frequently for the proposition that 
it “reviews judgments, not opinions,”280 or when drawing analogies to 
agency cases.281 The Court also cited Chevron on numerous occasions 
where it expressly declined to apply the standard. In many of those 
cases, the Court opted to apply a different standard, such as 
 
 276. See HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 35, § 6.1 (observing that “[f]ederal agencies conduct 
millions of adjudications each year” and “dwarf courts in terms of the proportion of adjudications 
resolved by the two types of institutions”). 
 277. See id. § 4.8 (explaining the preference). 
 278. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844–45.  
 279. Cases were identified by searching the Supreme Court database in Westlaw for “467 U.S. 
837” and by keyciting the Chevron decision, also in Westlaw. See Appendix (offering additional 
details regarding methodology and listing cases). 
 280. See, e.g., Jennings v. Stephens, 574 U.S. 271, 274 (2015) (citing Chevron in asserting that 
“[t]his Court, like all other federal appellate courts, does not review lower courts’ opinions, but 
their judgments”); Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 716 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Chevron in stating that the Court only reviews judgments, not opinions); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 
U.S. 33, 51 n.9 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same); Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 155 (1991) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (same). 
 281. See, e.g., Teva Pharm. U.S.A. Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 351 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (analogizing determining patent indefiniteness to the first step in Chevron analysis); 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 387 n.13 (2000) (asserting that Congress has not delegated power 
to state courts in the same manner that it has delegated power to agencies). 
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Skidmore.282 In others, the Court expressly declined to decide whether 
Chevron applied.283 In yet another subset of cases, the majority opinion 
was silent altogether regarding deference doctrine while a concurring 
or dissenting opinion raised the possibility of Chevron deference.284 
Finally, a small subset of Chevron citations came in dissents or other 
statements accompanying memorandum orders denying certiorari.285 
Particularly challenging to categorize were cases in which a 
majority opinion noted that the agency claimed Chevron deference or 
a lower court applied Chevron, and a concurring or dissenting opinion 
also suggested that Chevron deference was warranted, but the majority 
opinion was less clear regarding its own view of Chevron’s applicability, 
typically because the majority found the statute clear. In some of these 
cases, the Court strongly implied that it used the Chevron framework, 
even if the Court did not say so expressly or defer to the agency.286 In 
others, the Court’s rhetoric was much more equivocal.287  
 
 282. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255–56 (2006) (applying Skidmore rather 
than Chevron to Department of Justice interpretative rule); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 111 n.6 (2002) (applying Skidmore rather than Chevron to EEOC 
guidelines); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) (applying Skidmore instead of Chevron 
to interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act by several agencies). 
 283. See, e.g., Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U.S. 624, 631 (2012) (ruling that 
determination of Chevron’s applicability to present case was unnecessary); Edelman v. Lynchburg 
Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002) (same); Calif. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 765–66 (1999) 
(same); Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465, 479 n.14 (1997) (same); Est. of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling 
Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992) (same). 
 284. See, e.g., Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 476–78 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that Chevron deference should have been granted to Department of Labor rulings); 
Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 29 n.1 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron’s holding that 
an agency need only adopt a reasonable interpretation of a statute to warrant deference); 
Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 136 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) (same); Miss. Power 
& Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 380–82 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (same). 
 285. See, e.g., VF Jeanswear LP v. EEOC, 140 S. Ct. 1202, 1204 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from the denial of certiorari) (Mem.) (arguing that Chevron deference should not apply to EEOC 
regulation not promulgated under agency’s statutory interpretation authority); Guedes v. Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 S. Ct. 789, 789–90 (2020) (statement of Gorsuch, 
J.) (Mem.) (finding Chevron deference inappropriate for a regulation from Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives); Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 690–95 (2020) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Mem.) (criticizing Chevron’s role in modern 
jurisprudence). 
 286. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284 (2001) (citing Chevron in describing 
authoritativeness of agency’s statutory interpretation without applying full Chevron framework); 
Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 130 (1990) (rejecting the Interstate 
Commerce Commission’s claim that its interpretation required deference under Chevron). 
 287. See, e.g., United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762 n.6 (1997) (deciding that the Court 
need not reach the question of Chevron deference); Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 
HICKMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2021  5:14 PM 
986  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:931 
Ultimately, of the 238 cases that cited Chevron in some manner, 
the Court arguably applied the Chevron standard to evaluate an agency 
legal interpretation in 107 cases.288 Only 23 of those cases concerned 
agency adjudications.289  
FIGURE 1: CHEVRON IN THE SUPREME COURT: ADJUDICATION VS. 
RULEMAKING, ALL APPLICATIONS 
Of course, when contemplating the stare decisis effect of the cases 
in which the Court claimed to apply the Chevron standard in evaluating 
agency adjudications, a few additional points are worth noting. First, at 
what point can an agency claim that stare decisis applies to entitle it to 
Chevron deference: when the Court says it is applying the Chevron 
standard to evaluate the agency’s adjudication, or when the Court 
actually defers? The agency won only 72 of the 107 cases identified as 
applying Chevron. And in the entire history of Chevron, the Court has 
deferred to agency interpretations advanced in adjudications a mere 14 
times—just 6 percent of the 238 cases in which the Court cited Chevron, 
 
26, 42–43 (1990) (declining to extend Chevron deference); Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 
158, 171 (1989) (same). 
 288. See Appendix (listing applicable cases).  
 289. To be precise, 22 cases concerned agency interpretations adopted in adjudications only, 
71 cases concerned agency interpretations adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking, and 
1 case—Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992)—concerned both, while 13 cases concerned 
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13 percent of the 107 cases in which the Court actually applied 
Chevron, and 19 percent of the 72 cases in which the Court applied 
Chevron and the agency won.290 
FIGURE 2: CHEVRON IN THE SUPREME COURT: RULEMAKING VS. 
ADJUDICATION, AGENCY WINS BECAUSE OF DEFERENCE 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, a judicial declaration that 
one agency’s adjudications are Chevron-eligible arguably should not 
carry over to those of another agency, especially given the tremendous 
variability in adjudication procedures from agency to agency and 
Mead’s context-specific analysis that affords deference to some 
adjudication procedures but not to others. The cases involving agency 
adjudications in which the Court either claimed to apply or expressly 
deferred under the Chevron standard involved a very small number of 
agencies, with just two agencies representing more than half of the 
adjudications in question.  
 
 290. Id. Although distinguishing Chevron Step Two cases from Chevron Step One cases is 
often difficult, in one of the fourteen cases in which the Court applied Chevron to evaluate an 
agency interpretation advanced in adjudication and the agency won, the Court found the meaning 
of the statute clear—arguably reducing the instances of Chevron deference to agency 
adjudications further to thirteen cases. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 
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TABLE 5: CHEVRON IN THE SUPREME COURT: ADJUDICATIONS BY AGENCY 
Agency Applied Deferred 
Board of Immigration Appeals/ 
  Immigration & Naturalization Service 
8 4 
National Labor Relations Board 6 3 
Comptroller of the Currency 2 2 
Federal Labor Relations Authority 2 2 
Interstate Commerce Commission 2 1 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. 1 1 
Commerce Department 1 1 
Environmental Protection Agency 1 0 
The numbers are even more stark when one considers only the 
cases since the Court narrowed Chevron’s scope in the Mead decision. 
From the time the Court decided Mead through the end of the October 
2019 term, the Court cited Chevron in 106 cases.291 Of those 106 cases, 
only 23 concerned agency adjudications at all. Of those 23 cases, the 
Court clearly and unequivocally applied the Chevron standard to 
evaluate agency interpretations in only 7, and the Court actually 
deferred in only 3.292 By comparison, the Court clearly and 
unequivocally applied the Chevron standard to evaluate agency 
interpretations adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking in 32 
post-Mead cases and actually deferred to the agency in 24 of those 
cases.293  
 
 291. This number does not include the Mead decision itself. 
 292. See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 56−57, 76 (2014) (plurality opinion) 
(applying and deferring under Chevron); Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583, 591 (2012) 
(same); United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 316−22 (2009) (same); see also Appendix 
(listing cases in each category). 
 293. See Appendix. 
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FIGURE 3: CHEVRON IN THE SUPREME COURT: ADJUDICATION VS. 
RULEMAKING SINCE MEAD 
Irrespective of whether the agency won or lost, of the 7 
adjudications to which the Court purported to apply the Chevron 
standard, 6 involved a single agency—the Board of Immigration 
Appeals—again, with the agency winning some and losing others.294 
The only post-Mead, non-BIA case in which the Court clearly applied 
and deferred under Chevron to an agency adjudication, United States 
v. Eurodif S.A.,295 also exemplifies why lower courts continue to 
struggle with which adjudications might be Chevron-eligible. Eurodif 
involved a Commerce Department antidumping determination under 
the Tariff Act of 1930.296 The statute authorized the imposition of 
antidumping duties on sales of “foreign merchandise” but not on sales 
of services, and the case concerned the Commerce Department’s 
conclusion that a particular set of transactions fell into the former 
 
 294. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (2018); Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798, 798 
(2015) (deciding that BIA interpretation did not receive Chevron deference because it was 
unreasonable); Scialabba, 573 U.S. at 56–69 (plurality opinion) (holding that BIA interpretation 
warranted Chevron deference); Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. at 591 (same); Negusie v. Holder, 
555 U.S. 511, 516–21 (2009) (holding the BIA’s interpretation would be accorded deference on 
remand); see also Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1567–72 (2017) (finding the 
meaning of the statute clear, so declining to decide whether the rule of lenity would apply rather 
than Chevron to resolve statutory ambiguity in similar circumstances). 
 295. United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305 (2009). 
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rather than the latter category.297 The Court applied Chevron and 
deferred to the agency’s interpretation of the statute, citing Mead.298 
Briefing in the case based the government’s claim to Chevron on two 
criteria: (1) the Federal Circuit’s prior characterization of the agency’s 
procedures as “relatively formal” and its decisions as “self-executing,” 
and (2) the Tariff Act’s call for judicial review of the agency’s factual 
findings using the substantial evidence standard.299 Another brief 
characterized the adjudication at issue as “on-the-record.”300 But no 
claim was made that the agency used actual Type A, APA formal 
adjudication, and the Court failed to explain whether all, some, or none 
of the noted characteristics prompted its decision to extend Chevron 
deference to this agency’s adjudications but not others. At the very 
least, this case stands out for the parties’ efforts to justify Chevron 
deference to what appears to have been a Type B, if relatively formal, 
adjudication. 
Regardless, whether viewed through a pre-Mead or post-Mead 
lens, when one considers Type A, Type B, and Type C adjudications, 
the Court’s consideration of the circumstances in which agency 
adjudications are Chevron-eligible has been astonishingly limited. 
Essentially all of the major Chevron cases, especially after Mead, arise 
in the rulemaking context. This is not surprising, however, because the 
theoretical justifications for Chevron deference fit best with 
rulemaking.  
2.  Traditional Stare Decisis Analysis.  The fact that the Supreme 
Court most often applies Chevron in the rulemaking context has 
important implications for stare decisis. Although the Court takes stare 
decisis seriously, it also describes stare decisis as a “principle of 
 
 297. Id.  
 298. Id. at 316. 
 299. Brief for the United States at 24, Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305 (Nos. 07-1059, 07-1078), 2008 
WL 2794014, at *24 (quoting Pesquera Mares Autrales Ltda. v. United States, 266 F.3d 1372, 
1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 300. Brief for Petitioners USEC Inc. & U.S. Enrichment Corp. at 27, Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 
305 (Nos. 07-1059, 07-1078), 2008 WL 2794015, at *27. 
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policy”301 rather than “an inexorable command.”302 Consequently, the 
Court has identified several factors that it considers relevant in 
deciding whether to honor stare decisis, including the quality of the 
Court’s reasoning in support of that precedent, the impact that 
overruling the precedent would have on legitimate reliance interests, 
and the workability of the rule or standard that precedent 
establishes.303 A full explication of stare decisis and Chevron is beyond 
the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, given these general parameters, 
a few points are worth noting. 
First, a threshold question should be acknowledged. Although the 
Court applies the same factors across a variety of legal contexts, it does 
not evaluate them in the same way in all circumstances. The Court has 
described the force of stare decisis as “enhanced” when the precedent 
interprets a statute, and Congress can reverse the Court;304 “reduced” 
when it involves procedural or other rules that do not guide primary 
behavior, where reliance interests are much lower;305 and “at its 
weakest” in constitutional cases, because constitutional amendment is 
so difficult.306 By this understanding, the entire Chevron framework 
may be entitled only to relatively weak stare decisis support under any 
circumstances, not just for adjudications.  
 
 301. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808, 828 (1991)); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970) 
(quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)). 
 302. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1405 (2020) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223, 233 (2009); cf. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422 (2019) (making the same point but opting 
to shape rather than overturn Auer deference).  
 303. See, e.g., Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019) (“We have identified several 
factors to consider in deciding whether to overrule a past decision, including ‘the quality of [its] 
reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other related 
decisions, . . . and reliance on the decision.’” (quoting Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. 
Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018))). 
 304. See Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 456 (2015) (“Indeed, we apply statutory 
stare decisis even when a decision has announced a ‘judicially created doctrine’ designed to 
implement a federal statute.” (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 
274 (2014))); Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 82–83 (2007) (describing “long congressional 
acquiescence” as enhancing statutory stare decisis). But see Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 
1960, 1987 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning this policy). 
 305. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2179 (noting in reference to potential reliance interests that “the 
force of stare decisis is ‘reduced’ when rules that do not ‘serve as a guide to lawful behavior’ are 
at issue” (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995))).  
 306. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478 (“The doctrine [of stare decisis] ‘is at its weakest when we 
interpret the Constitution because our interpretation can be altered only by constitutional 
amendment or by overruling our prior decisions.’” (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 
(1997))). 
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Tremendous disagreement exists over exactly what type of legal 
doctrine Chevron represents. Judicial opinions and academic literature 
variously describe Chevron as a standard of review, a canon or method 
of statutory interpretation, and a rule of decision.307 How one 
characterizes Chevron may affect its entitlement to stare decisis.308 For 
example, stare decisis arguably has little, if any, force for canons or 
methods of statutory interpretation, which generally are considered 
nonprecedential.309 Although the Court traditionally has treated 
Chevron, much like Auer,310 as a doctrine that the courts must apply 
when certain conditions are satisfied,311 some scholars argue that 
Chevron is better understood as a canon or method of statutory 
interpretation, and thus that stare decisis should not apply to it at all.312 
At any rate, the Court’s own precedent on precedent—most notably, 
Mead and Kisor—confirms that in the specific context of deference, 
some modification is allowed without offending stare decisis. 
Second, turning to the traditional factors, because Chevron was 
conceived in the context of judicial review of agency rulemaking and 
has been applied mostly in rulemaking cases, the Court’s analysis of 
why Chevron ought to apply to agency adjudications as well is 
comparatively limited. Presumably because of Chenery II, the Court 
almost reflexively mentions formal adjudications alongside notice-and-
comment regulations as agency actions that carry the force of law and 
thus are entitled to Chevron deference under the analysis of Mead. Yet, 
as Asimow’s work and this Article demonstrate, real-world 
adjudications do not fall neatly into categories of formal and informal 
adjudications. And the Court has offered next to no analysis or 
 
 307. See generally Kristin E. Hickman & David Hahn, Categorizing Chevron, 81 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 611 (2020) (describing the different ways in which courts and scholars have categorized 
Chevron and arguing, where it matters, for thinking of Chevron as a standard of review). 
 308. Id. at 650–55. 
 309. Id. at 653–54.  
 310. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1997) (describing the agency’s 
interpretation as “controlling,” and further observing that the agency’s interpretation “is in no 
sense a ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action 
against attack” and “[t]here is simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect 
the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question”).  
 311. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 121 (2000) (explaining 
Chevron deference as a mandatory doctrine). 
 312. See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the Law 
of Stare Decisis, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1152–61 (2019); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in 
Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1807–11 (2010). 
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guidance as to which procedures make an adjudication formal enough 
or how courts should discern when Congress has authorized an agency 
to act with the force of law through adjudication. The result is a lack of 
theoretical support, beyond Chenery II in the background, for applying 
Chevron to adjudication as well as rulemaking.  
Third, Chevron generally does not present especially strong 
reliance interests in the context of agency adjudications.313 Rulemaking 
is already favored in the law.314 Regulations often stay on the books for 
quite some time. An opportunity for widespread public participation is 
an expectation of the procedural requirements for rulemaking.315 
Agencies as well as private parties are bound by them. By contrast, 
adjudications occur more frequently and are more limited in their 
participation and scope. Also, the interpretations they advance 
commonly have a shorter shelf life. Agencies may treat their 
adjudications as having quasi-precedential effect316 and may not 
deviate from past adjudications without some explanation.317 But the 
Court has recognized that adjudications offer agencies flexibility that 
regulations lack. Indeed, this point was one of the reasons for the 
Court’s general endorsement in Chenery II of adjudication as a 
policymaking format.318  
Moreover, if the Court were to change the deference scheme as 
this Article suggests, past cases evaluating agency interpretations of 
statutes would not have to be revisited, as the primary precedential 
effect of those cases concerns statutory interpretations that the Court 
either upheld or rejected, not whether the Court relied on Chevron 
deference in reaching those conclusions.319 The only change would be 
 
 313. Justice Gorsuch has argued that Chevron itself has not created reliance interests. See 
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1157–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
Our argument does not depend on this broader point.  
 314. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947). 
 315. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2018). 
 316. See, e.g., Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 231, at 1494 (explaining that an agency 
adjudicative order “may state a broad interpretive principle that would clearly affect many other 
cases”).  
 317. HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 35, § 11.6 (documenting the courts’ reluctance to accept 
unexplained departures from agency precedent).  
 318. See, e.g., Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202–03 (offering as a justification for “case-by-case 
evolution of statutory standards” via adjudication that “the agency may not have had sufficient 
experience with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and 
fast rule”). 
 319. Cf. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008) (“Principles of stare decisis, 
after all, demand respect for precedent whether judicial methods of interpretation change or stay 
the same.”). 
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how courts and agencies approach their analysis of agency 
interpretations of statutes advanced in future adjudications.  
Finally, as described in Part II above, applying Chevron to agency 
adjudications raises questions and concerns that either do not exist or 
at least do not present similarly in the rulemaking context. Put simply, 
Chevron and agency adjudications are an awkward fit, like putting a 
square peg in a round hole. Whatever concerns Chevron’s critics have 
with respect to its workability for judicial review of agency rulemaking, 
those issues are magnified substantially in the adjudication context. To 
date, the Court has seen fit mostly to ignore those issues, contributing 
to the “undertheorization” of Chevron and adjudication. In fact, the 
Court’s general failure to address the problems raised by applying 
Chevron in the adjudication context more robustly should give the 
Court at least a somewhat freer hand to revise its own handiwork.  
3. Changed Circumstances.  Meanwhile, other doctrinal 
developments have emerged that further cast doubt on Chevron’s 
applicability to adjudications, additionally undermining the force of 
stare decisis.320 In particular, since the Supreme Court decided Mead, 
at least three important doctrinal developments, taken together, have 
altered the legal landscape—giving rise to significant fairness and 
bootstrapping concerns that did not exist when the Court decided 
Mead and raising questions about the wisdom of continuing to apply 
Chevron to agency adjudications. Under the law of precedent, these 
changes matter. 
One important development is the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brand X, in which the Court concluded that agencies using Chevron-
eligible formats could overturn contrary circuit court interpretations of 
ambiguous statutes.321 Like so many of the Court’s key Chevron 
decisions, Brand X involved notice-and-comment rulemaking as the 
FCC adopted an interpretation contrary to that of the Ninth Circuit. 
As Justice Gorsuch has recognized, Brand X potentially creates bizarre 
effects in the context of adjudication, especially when a party has relied 
 
 320. See, e.g., Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1695 (2019) (declining to follow an earlier 
case because an intervening case had “undercut both pillars of [the earlier case’s] reasoning”); 
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018) (overcoming stare 
decisis, in part, because the precedent at issue had “been undermined by more recent decisions”). 
 321. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 982–83 (2005); 
HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 35, § 3.6.4 (explaining doctrine). 
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on a previous statement of law from a court.322 It is one thing to let an 
agency change the law going forward; it is something else to let an 
agency change the law that applies to what has already happened, 
especially when private parties have relied on judicial decisions.323 It is 
doubtful that the Mead Court had this in mind when it advocated the 
eligibility of formal adjudications for Chevron review. Nor was it 
contemplated in Chevron, which, again, concerned prospective 
rulemaking and not retroactive adjudication. So long as Brand X is law 
and Chevron applies in the adjudication context, cases like Gutierrez-
Brizuela v. Lynch324 will arise, where private parties will not be able to 
plan their lives around judicial holdings.325 The Tenth Circuit, with 
then-Judge Gorsuch writing, attempted to get around this problem by 
finding a limit on the scope of Brand X. A better solution would be to 
avoid the problem altogether by narrowing Chevron’s domain.  
The second development is the continued trend among the circuit 
courts of treating the choice-of-adjudication procedures as a matter of 
agency discretion that itself is eligible for Chevron deference. As noted 
above, since the Court decided Mead, the First Circuit explicitly 
adopted this approach as well—and cited Brand X as the impetus for 
replacing its previous presumption with Chevron deference to the 
agency’s procedural choices.326 This jurisprudential shift—and the 
bootstrapping it enables—should matter in how one thinks about Mead 
and Chevron deference for agency adjudications. Congress rarely 
expressly requires APA formal adjudication procedures. As a growing 
number of circuits give agencies more control over the procedures they 
use, those courts simultaneously allow agencies to choose whether they 
will receive Chevron deference for the interpretations advanced 
through those adjudications.327  
 
 322. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1150–52 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring); see also Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 512–14, 530–33, 545–46 (9th Cir. 
2012) (en banc) (featuring several opinions struggling with the issue). 
 323. See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1150 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Quite literally then, 
after this court declared the statutes’ meaning and issued a final decision, an executive agency was 
permitted to (and did) tell us to reverse our decision like some sort of super court of appeals.”).  
 324. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 325. See supra text accompanying notes 215–21920 (describing the circumstances of 
Gutierrez-Brizuela and De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 2015)). 
 326. See Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 16–18 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 327. The Supreme Court, of course, could also hold that these circuit court cases are mistaken. 
But to the extent that the Court accepts this growing line of precedent, it undermines the case for 
Chevron in the adjudication context.  
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The third jurisprudential development after Mead is the Supreme 
Court’s decisions strengthening the fair notice doctrine. As noted 
above, in recent years, the Court has breathed life into this doctrine, 
which limits an agency’s ability to retroactively make policy through 
adjudication.328 Whereas circuit court cases in the pre-Mead era had 
recognized the “due process” implications of retroactively making 
policy,329 the Court itself had addressed the topic on only a few 
occasions, with its main case on the subject probably being Chenery II. 
That presumably is why the Court in Christopher cited D.C. Circuit 
precedent, rather than its own cases, for “the principle that agencies 
should provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of the conduct [a 
regulation] prohibits or requires.’”330 As explained above, this 
development cuts against Chevron deference in the adjudication 
context.  
These post-Mead developments, combined with administrative 
law’s traditional preference for rulemaking as the better vehicle for 
agency policy choice,331 suggest that the Court could limit Chevron’s 
applicability to the rulemaking context without seriously offending 
stare decisis. The fact that the Court has occasionally deferred to 
interpretations announced in adjudication is important. But that fact 
also must be understood in context; in reality, the overwhelming 
majority of the Court’s applications of Chevron are rulemaking cases, 
not adjudication cases. And the Court has not yet considered how the 
intervening developments in the broader law discussed here may affect 
the proper scope of Chevron’s domain.  
B. Narrowing, Not Overruling 
The foregoing analysis, moreover, is reinforced by the Supreme 
Court’s prior narrowing of its deference standards irrespective of stare 
decisis. As already documented, the Court has already narrowed 
Chevron’s scope, in Mead and King, without raising stare decisis 
concerns. More recently, in Kisor, the Supreme Court narrowed Auer 
deference without suggesting that doing so violated stare decisis. Here, 
we do not argue that the Supreme Court should throw out Chevron 
 
 328. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155–59 (2012). 
 329. See, e.g., Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 
156 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (opinion of Scalia, J.). 
 330. Christopher, 567 U.S. at 156 (alteration in original) (quoting Gates & Fox Co., 790 F.2d 
at 156). 
 331. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (explaining that 
although an agency can choose its policymaking tool, rulemaking is generally more appropriate). 
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altogether. We just urge that Chevron’s domain be narrowed. Kisor 
provides the roadmap for what we have in mind. 
In Kisor, the lone question before the Court was whether to 
overrule Auer. Invoking stare decisis, Justice Kagan, joined by a 
plurality of the Court and Chief Justice Roberts in part and for the 
judgment, explained why Auer should be retained. Yet the Court did 
not simply reaffirm Auer; the Justices narrowed it. Kagan emphasized 
that “even as we uphold [Auer], we reinforce its limits” and “further 
develop [them] today.”332 The Court then took “the opportunity to 
restate, and somewhat expand on” what the Court had said before, in 
an effort to “clear up some mixed messages.”333 That “expan[sion]” was 
really a narrowing of Auer’s scope. The Court stressed, for instance, 
that real ambiguity must be present and courts have the threshold 
ability to resolve “hard interpretive conundrums, even relating to 
complex rules.”334 The Court also expressly repudiated language 
suggesting that Auer was more deferential than Chevron.335 Likewise, 
the Court held that interpretation must be “the agency’s ‘authoritative’ 
or ‘official position,’ rather than any more ad hoc statement not 
reflecting the agency’s views,” and “must in some way implicate its 
substantive expertise.”336 “When the agency has no comparative 
expertise in resolving a regulatory ambiguity,” deference is 
inappropriate.337 Importantly, although not per se forbidding the 
practice, the Court also strongly hinted that courts should not defer to 
agency interpretations advanced in briefs, at least not ordinarily.338  
Auer deference is no longer the same creature that it was. 
Previously, most courts did not understand Auer to be as narrow as 
Kisor now holds, and Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in Kisor 
pointedly casts doubt on older cases from the Supreme Court itself that 
did not apply Kisor’s newly announced limitations.339 What we propose 
 
 332. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019) (upholding, but modifying, Auer v. 
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)). 
 333. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414 (emphasis added). 
 334. See id. at 2414–15 (citing Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 335. See id. at 2416. 
 336. Id. at 2416–17. 
 337. Id. at 2417. 
 338. See id. at 2417 n.6. 
 339. See id. at 2414–15 (criticizing—with an “e.g.”—United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864 
(1977), for applying “deference without significant analysis of the underlying regulation” and 
Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969), for applying “deference without 
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here is similar. Just as the Kisor Court narrowed Auer without 
offending stare decisis—in fact, the Court’s judgment depends on stare 
decisis340—the Court could also narrow Chevron’s domain without 
doing serious damage to precedent.  
Mead itself fit this pattern. Prior to Mead, the Court’s language did 
not limit Chevron according to the legal force of agency action or the 
procedures used by the agency. Mead changed how Chevron was 
understood to work for entire categories of cases. That change is one 
reason why Justice Scalia’s dissent in Mead was so bellicose; he viewed 
the Court’s decision as a departure from Chevron.341 Yet the Court’s 
majority disagreed and concluded that it was free to narrow Chevron’s 
domain. The Court could and should do so again.  
C. Consider the Alternative 
Our final argument is directed to pragmatists. It is almost a 
foregone conclusion that the Supreme Court will do something with 
Chevron; the Justices are too invested in the issue to stand down 
entirely. The Supreme Court has already begun nibbling around the 
edges.342 And the Chief Justice—who, in Kisor, cast the deciding vote 
to save Auer—has gone out of his way to invite further litigation about 
Chevron.343 The Court is looking for a path. Unless it has a plan in 
mind, the Court, acting on its dissatisfaction with Chevron, may make 
a hash of judicial deference doctrine and create unintended 
consequences through ad hoc revisions based on the facts of individual 
cases. Indeed, if there are not five votes to scrap the entire Chevron 
 
careful attention to the nature and context of the interpretation”). Notably, Justice Gorsuch 
observed that “[t]he majority leaves Auer so riddled with holes that, when all is said and done, 
courts may find that it does not constrain their independent judgment any more than Skidmore.” 
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 340. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct at 2422–23.  
 341. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 256–57 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“To 
decide the present case, I would adhere to the original formulation of Chevron . . . . Chevron sets 
forth an across-the-board presumption, which operates as a background rule of law against which 
Congress legislates . . . .”). 
 342. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (rejecting Chevron deference 
where the government’s position is inconsistent between agencies). 
 343. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Roberts Mostly Joins Liberal Justices as SCOTUS Refuses 
To Overturn Auer Decision on Agency Power, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (June 26, 2019, 9:50 AM), http:/
/www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme-court-rules-on-federal-regulator-power-in-case-on-
auer-deference [https://perma.cc/A3QJ-G3LK] (“Roberts and four other conservative justices, in 
separate opinions, made clear that they did not think the majority ruling upholding Auer 
foreclosed a review of Chevron deference.”). 
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framework, a series of ad hoc, case-driven limits seems likely unless the 
Court can land on a unified theory. Regardless of one’s views of 
Chevron generally, the prospect of ad hoc limits rather than principled 
narrowing should not be attractive.  
At bottom, there is no bright-line rule governing when the Court 
should overrule a case.344 And there is reason to think that the Court 
has its eyes on Chevron. In light of that reality, the question for those 
who think stare decisis should apply here is what restrictions on 
Chevron make the most sense. Curtailing it for adjudications fits that 
description. 
CONCLUSION 
Chevron is under attack—and sometimes it deserves it. Why, for 
instance, does Justice Gorsuch dislike Chevron so much? It is because 
of cases like Gutierrez-Brizuela, where an agency not only told a court 
to read a statute in a liberty-depriving way but also instructed that same 
court to apply the agency’s “new rule to completed conduct that 
transpired at a time when the contrary judicial precedent appeared to 
control.”345 Retroactivity is disfavored for a reason. Cases likes 
Gutierrez-Brizuela give Chevron’s critics ammunition.  
If Kisor is a guide, the Supreme Court is looking for a path to 
curtail Chevron that is grounded in doctrine, administrable in practice, 
potent enough to prevent abuse, and limited enough to preserve the 
doctrine’s core. This Article offers that path. Mead’s insight that not all 
types of agency action merit deference is valid, but that insight should 
be taken further. Dropping deference for agency adjudications is a 
workable middle ground, preserving Chevron for notice-and-comment 
regulations where it is most defensible while eliminating it in those 
contexts for which Chevron is less defensible in theory and more 
dangerous in practice. Whatever one’s views of Chevron generally, the 
reality is that deferring in the adjudication context is in tension with 
Chevron’s theoretical justifications, can produce real unfairness, and 
has created a mess in the lower courts to boot. All of this can be 
addressed by narrowing Chevron’s domain. So, really, why not do it?  
 
 344. See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of 
Precedent, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1843, 1853 (2013) (noting that Justices characterize stare decisis “as a 
matter of discretion rather than compulsion”).  
 345. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1143 (10th Cir. 2016). 
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APPENDIX 
Westlaw indicates that the Supreme Court has cited the Chevron 
decision on 238 separate occasions, including the Chevron decision 
itself.346 In creating the charts in Part III above, we reviewed and 
categorized all 238 cases to determine whether (1) the Court cited 
Chevron for some proposition other than deference; (2) Chevron was 
cited in a concurring or dissenting opinion rather than by the majority; 
(3) the majority opinion indicated it was actually utilizing the Chevron 
standard or merely cited it in passing; (4) the majority deferred to the 
agency; and (5) the interpretation at issue was advanced through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, adjudication, or some other format. 
The following summarizes our categorization of the cases. 
 
 346. Cases were identified by searching the Supreme Court database in Westlaw for “467 U.S. 
837” and by keyciting the Chevron decision, also in Westlaw. These searches yielded 242 results, 
including the Chevron decision itself. Three of those were memorandum orders denying rehearing 
in which the Westlaw synopsis, rather than the Court’s order, contained the citation. We excluded 
those three memorandum orders in our study. See Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 468 U.S. 1227 (1984) (Mem.) (denying petition for rehearing); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 468 U.S. 1227 (1984) (Mem.) (same); Ruckelshaus v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 468 U.S. 1227 (1984) (Mem.) (same). We also excluded from the study Stutson 
v. United States, 516 U.S. 193 (1996) (per curiam).  Stutson was a criminal case in which the Court 
addressed its criteria for GVR’ing cases. The Court issued its per curiam opinion in Stutson 
simultaneously with its opinion in Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163 (1996) (per curiam), which 
concerned social security benefits and was also GVR’d. Justice Scalia dissented from both Stutson 
and Lawrence in a single opinion, and mentioned Chevron in that dissent. See Stutson, 516 U.S. 
at 198 (cross-referencing Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence); Lawrence, 516 U.S. at 177 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). Although Scalia’s dissent only invoked Chevron in relation to Lawrence, and the U.S. 
Reporter appended the dissent to Lawrence, Westlaw chose to include Scalia’s dissent under the 
citation to Stutson. See Lawrence, 516 U.S. at 186–88 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Accordingly, 
excluding Stutson seemed appropriate. We retained, however, several statements regarding 
denials of certiorari in which individual Justices expressed substantive views regarding Chevron. 
See, e.g., Whitman v. United States, 574 U.S. 1003 (2014) (Mem.) (Scalia, J., respecting the denial 
of certiorari) (discussing Chevron deference in interpreting criminal statutes); Texas v. Hopwood, 
518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (Mem.) (Ginsburg, J., respecting the denial of the petition for a writ of 
certiorari). Finally, in the course of our research, we discovered one case that arguably extends 
Chevron deference without actually citing Chevron. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002). In 
that case, the Court gave unlabeled “deference” to the SEC’s “reasonable” interpretation of an 
“ambiguous” statute expressed by the SEC through formal adjudication, citing Mead as support. 
Id. at 819–20. Because we cannot say conclusively that the Court was applying Chevron rather 
than Skidmore in that case, and because we otherwise limited our study to cases in which the 
Court cited Chevron, we did not include the Zandford decision in our analysis. 
HICKMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2021  5:14 PM 
2021] NARROWING CHEVRON’S DOMAIN 1001 
Majority Opinions Applying Chevron Two-Step Framework 
(Agency win because of deference marked by asterisk) 
Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019) 
Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) 
Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067 (2018) 
Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018) 
Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017) 
Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 137 S. Ct. 1190 (2017) 
*Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) 
*FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) 
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) 
Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015) 
Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014) 
*Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41 (2014)347 
*EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2014) 
*City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013) 
*Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145 (2013) 
*Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583 (2012) 
*Astrue v. Capato, 566 U.S. 541 (2012) 
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478 
(2012)348 
*Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Res. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 
(2011) 
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519 (2009) 
*Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009) 
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009)349 
 
 347. In Scialabba, Justice Kagan’s opinion for the Court represented only a plurality of three 
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 348. A key section of Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court in the Home Concrete case 
represented only a plurality of four Justices, but both Breyer for the Court and Justice Scalia in 
concurrence agreed that Chevron provided the standard of review and that Supreme Court 
precedent rendered the statute clear, and clearly contrary to the agency’s interpretation.  
 349. In Negusie, the agency neither won nor lost precisely. The agency felt bound in its 
decisionmaking by judicial precedent that the Court later said the agency misinterpreted. 
Although the Court made clear that the statute was ambiguous and the agency was eligible for 
Chevron deference, it did not defer to the agency but rather remanded the case to the agency to 
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give it the opportunity to exercise its discretion. We have categorized the case here as the Court 
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case in its own category). 
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necessary to comprise a majority of the Court in favor of the agency, however, and his opinion 
makes clear his reliance on Chevron in evaluating the case. Accordingly, notwithstanding 
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Stevens’s silence regarding Chevron, we categorized this case as an application of Chevron by the 
majority. 
 352. The Court splintered over whether the standard for an injunction against a prescription 
drug program adopted by the state of Maine was satisfied based on federal preemption and 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges. The Department of Health and Human Services 
submitted an amicus brief in favor of the injunction, but the Court largely ignored it. Writing for 
a four-Justice plurality, Justice Stevens said that HHS could act more definitively to claim federal 
preemption and reject Maine’s program, but he did not mention Chevron in making that 
suggestion. Justice Breyer, who joined the plurality opinion, authored a concurring opinion in 
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both Chevron and Skidmore without specifying which would apply. Justices Scalia and Thomas 
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concurring opinions were essential to the outcome of the case, we categorized this case as not 
involving an application of Chevron by the majority. 
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